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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
BANKRUPTCY
Daniel J.H. Greenwood *
ABSTRACT
Ordinary corporate law invests enormous authority in corporate
leaders, largely without accountability either to those they govern or to the
judiciary, in defiance of much of what we know about effective governance
procedure. Instead, we rely on the markets in which the corporation
participates as the primary check on incumbent officials. Regardless of
whether relying on markets is sufficient in the ordinary course, corporate
insolvency is the markets’ verdict that incumbent management has failed.
Accordingly, in bankruptcy and insolvency more generally, the law ought to
abandon its ordinary deference to the corporate powers that be and instead
impose standard good governance rules. Failed incumbents should be
replaced and those governed should have political voice, not merely market
exit rights.
INTRODUCTION
How does or should corporate governance change in insolvency or its
vicinity? The special problems of bankruptcy emerge only by comparison
with governance outside of the bankruptcy regime. Accordingly, this
Article summarizes the ordinary course from the perspective of corporate
law’s formal governance rules and more broadly in light of the actual
workings of the finance markets. Then, it suggests a few implications this
background may have for bankruptcy and corporate law as well as some of
the specific proposals discussed in the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate,
Financial & Commercial Law’s Spring 2018 Symposium on “The Market
for Corporate Control in the Zone of Insolvency.”
In short, American law reflects no consensus on the proper goals of
corporate law. Instead, corporate law is largely procedural, providing a
framework for deciding these issues rather than resolutions. The
framework, however, is neither neutral nor the product of reasoned debate
about the proper functioning of corporate governance in our self-governing,
mixed economy democracy. On the contrary, corporate law is strongly
tilted in favor of empowering incumbent officeholders, without much
regard to how they use, or abuse, that power except in the most extreme
circumstances. Accordingly, to evaluate both the rules of ordinary corporate
law and the special problems of insolvency, we need to step outside the

* Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra
University.

100

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

legal frameworks and think more broadly about the social goals this area of
the law ought to promote.
Ordinarily, corporate law struggles with a series of difficult trade-offs.
In bankruptcy, some of these conflicts become easier to resolve. In a market
economy, solvency is the minimum measure of success—never sufficient
but always necessary—for a private corporation. When incumbent
officeholders and their shareholder electors have failed to achieve even this
lowest measure of the public interest, arguments for stacking the deck in
favor of incumbent wealth and power lose much of their power.
Market economies progress in significant part by Schumpeter’s
“creative destruction.” 1 Bureaucratic business corporations, like other
institutions, tend to be inflexible and unable to change rapidly. It is hard to
change the way a firm does business when it is staffed largely by people
who succeeded under the old way. Therefore, much as biological evolution
is driven by the extinction of highly successful species closely adapted to
ecosystems that no longer exist, economic progress is often marked by the
failures of once important businesses. Economies that stop this process end
up trapped in old ways of doing business that no longer make sense—
burning coal or oil, for example, because changing to more modern and
efficient fuels would require too much disruption of the existing energy,
transportation and housing industries. It should never be the goal of
insolvency law to excessively slow this critical process.
On the other hand, preservation of existing institutional structures is
always attractive: institutions are easy to destroy and hard to replace. When
a business, especially a relatively large one, closes down, the collateral
damage may be quite serious. Jobs, working relationships, products and
supply chains are never fungible. Employees who lose their jobs are likely
to find it difficult to find similar replacements, especially if they have spent
significant time developing firm-specific skills such as knowing the
strengths and weaknesses of teammates or production systems. Similarly,
customers and suppliers, whether individuals or other businesses, will
inevitably lose time and money finding alternatives, and presumably the
alternatives they do find will often be second bests (otherwise, why did they
not switch earlier?). Multiplier effects mean that neighbors and unrelated
businesses and their employees are likely to suffer as well: former
employees are likely to be forced to change their spending patterns, uproot
and move families, sell homes, and so on.
In light of the difficulties that abrupt change causes for ordinary citizens
and the economy as a whole, even when change is necessary, it makes sense
for bankruptcy to lean against the tendency of markets to view the past as
1. Capitalism is an evolutionary process “that incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” JOSEPH
A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–83 (1994).
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irrelevant, to constantly sweep away old methods of production, and to
refuse to give any weight to sunk costs. Markets are radically innovative
and constantly revolutionizing; the law can safely be somewhat
conservative.
Accordingly, it is often appropriate for the law to seek to avoid
liquidation of insolvent firms. Especially at the bottom of the business
cycle, it is often difficult to tell whether insolvency is the result of
obsolescence, incompetence or just bad luck. It is always possible, even
likely, that a failing firm can be preserved, avoiding dislocation and misery,
with relatively modest reforms.
That preservationist anti-market logic, however, does not apply to
preserving the wealth or power of incumbent managers and shareholders.
There is no reason to assume that the administrators and electors who ran an
institution into insolvency are the right ones to reform and restore it. 2 On
the contrary, the default is that failed managers and leaders ought to be
replaced. To be sure, there is no guarantee that the replacement will be
better. Nonetheless, past failure is not a good predictor of future success.
Ordinary corporate governance rules are extraordinarily deferential to
incumbent office holders. Yet, since corporate governance is centrally about
managing people—governance—the ordinary lessons of political theory
largely apply. Power corrupts. Voting is the best way to assure that citizens
are treated as partners in a collective project, rather than colonial subjects to
be exploited, benevolently or otherwise, for someone else’s benefit.
Corporate law’s incumbent protection should be suspect on its face.
The usual defense of corporate law’s extraordinary grant of power to
corporate elites is that markets will take care of problems. Firms run by
incompetent or corrupt managers will not do well in consumer and labor
markets, and the stock market will notice. Dropping share prices will lead
directors to fire the malefactors. Alternatively, if they do not, more attentive
investors will buy up the shares and associated votes necessary to replace
2. The same, of course, is true of institutional creditors (bank lenders and bond holders). Both
the bond market and banks are in the business of helping savers to invest small amounts in many
different firms, thus transforming the unpredictable business risk of particular companies into a
more predictable statistical risk. They are paid interest to assume this risk, much as an insurance
company—also in the business of diversifying away risk—is paid premiums to compensate for the
risks it assumes. When the risk they were paid to assume actually occurs, the law should generally
be seeking to force them to accept the consequences of the agreement they made rather than
relieving them from it.
The social function of these lenders is to transform savings into investment capital. If they invest
in poorly run companies or fail to properly assess risk, they have not done their job. Accordingly,
incompetent lenders generally should be left to the tender mercies of the market, not allowed to
rewrite their obligations retrospectively. (The macro-economic problems caused by bank runs and
bond market panics may counsel against relying overmuch on inherently unstable financial
markets. However, here as well, protections against “contagion” should be focused on savers, on
the model of the FDIC’s deposit insurance, rather than incumbent financial intermediaries as in
the bank bailouts of the last financial crisis).
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directors and, ultimately, managers. If these finance-based mechanisms fail,
the firm will succumb to the evolutionary pressures of competitive supplier,
labor or consumer markets.
When the firm is insolvent, this defense no longer applies. Insolvency is
a failure in a business carried on for profit. Consequently, the corporate law
regime has failed. Corporate incumbents have demonstrated their inability
to operate the firm successfully; boards have failed to replace them; and the
stock market has failed to replace them. Similarly, the firm’s failure
demonstrates its inability to read and respond to the price signals of the
competitive markets in which it must outbid others for sales, talent and
physical and financial inputs.
Accordingly, insolvency law ought to abandon ordinary corporate law
deference. Insolvency calls not for a strengthening of the authority of Wall
Street but for countervailing powers and answerability to those dependent
on and—ideally—benefiting from corporate law.
Part I summarizes at some length ordinary corporate law, outside of
insolvency, emphasizing its deference to incumbent corporate officials. Part
II seeks to discern goals of corporate law from the ordinary workings,
finding instead that corporate law structures a struggle over corporate
surplus in aid of top management and investors and to the detriment of
other corporate participants. Part III briefly sets out some implications for
insolvency. Edward Janger and Adam Levitin, in their article, One Dollar,
One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, justify their policy
proposals on inferences from normative principles they see as embedded in
ordinary corporate law; 3 I contest both the embeddedness of the principles
and their applicability in insolvency. Instead, insolvency means that the
empirical-economic premises underlying conventional corporate law have
been falsified.
In insolvency, the law ought to take a different direction. In sharp
contrast to conventional corporate law, insolvency law should be hospitable
to alternative theories of governance—including the lessons we learn from
conventional democratic and republican theory. Here, at least, we should
take seriously republican lessons of countervailing and separated powers,
liberal demands for fundamental individual rights and due process
constraints on arbitrary power, the democratic teachings of answerability to
the ruled, and, above all else, the ancient rejection of corruption. The goal
of corporate leaders must be the good of the whole, not the private
enrichment of themselves or financial market participants.

3. Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance
in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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I. THE ORDINARY COURSE
The basic paradigm of corporate governance outside of bankruptcy is a
study in stark contrasts. On the one hand, corporate law grants corporate
elites with largely unreviewable authority and control over corporate
decision making, without regard to opinions or requirements of input from
others. 4 On the other hand, executives serve at the pleasure of their boards, 5
and while a successful chief executive officer (CEO) has de facto power to
fill the board with supporters, loyalty cannot be guaranteed. Similarly,
boards are elected by vote of the shares and shares are freely bought and
sold, suggesting that, at least with respect to publicly traded companies,
nominally powerful boards are actually subject to the whims of febrile
financial markets. 6 Yet, most of the time, shareholders can be counted on to
follow the “Wall Street Rule”—if you are unhappy with incumbent
managers, then sell your stock to someone who likes them better—so that
the usual shareholder vote looks more like a Saddam Hussein-era plebiscite
than a contested election. To be sure, from time to time an outsider seeks to
buy enough shares (and votes) to count, but corporate law grants managers
enormous power to resist, including the nearly always effective poison pill. 7
In the end, the incumbents must be convinced to surrender.
Perhaps most confoundingly, conventional wisdom, routinely repeated
by the business press, business schools, opinion makers and courts, is that
corporations are obliged to maximize profits and boards ought to place
shareholder profit above other goals. In contrast, however, standard
corporate finance, as taught to our business elites for at least half a century,
preaches that debt and equity are largely interchangeable 8 and that firms
4. The business judgment rule, much like rational basis review in constitutional law, Chevron
deference in administrative law or comity in international law, limits judicial review of board and
managerial decisions in nearly all circumstances, barring conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (under business judgment rule, a court presumes “that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company”).
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010) (vesting power to operate corporation in board).
6. See generally Robert J. Shiller, Causes of Changing Financial Market Volatility 1–32
(Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, 1988) (discussing volatility in financial markets that cannot be explained by changes in
available information); Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (Hyman P. Minsky
Archive, Paper 144, 1986), http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/144 (contending that
stable markets lead to risk taking which leads to instability).
7. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) (upholding poison pill).
8. That bonds and stock are largely interchangeable is the underpinning of the Modigliani and
Miller independence propositions, taught to every beginning finance student, that the value of a
firm, under “perfect” capital markets and without taxes, is independent of whether it is financed
by debt or equity, and that under similar conditions investors should be indifferent as to whether
corporate surplus is paid out as dividends, interest or reinvested in the firm. See, e.g., IVO WELCH,
CORPORATE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 578 (2009); Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262
(1958); Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and The Cost of Capital: A
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963).
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ought to seek to minimize—not maximize—their cost of capital, as if the
goal were to reduce rather than increase profit. Similarly, standard microeconomic theory teaches that in a competitive market any firm that does not
minimize such costs will be forced out of business by lower cost
competitors; no firm in a fully competitive market could possibly pay out
dividends.
Moreover, profit maximization is distinctly contrary to the actual
interests of most shareholders. 9 The human ones are likely to have far larger
financial and emotional commitments to other roles—as citizens,
consumers, producers, family members—that routinely will make
conflicting claims. Most simply, nearly all of us have larger investments in
our jobs, and our children’s future, than in the stock market. The
institutional shareholders are diversified, so that they should be entirely
indifferent to attempts by one publicly traded firm to compete with another;
what they win in one pocket, they lose from the other. Instead, large scale
investors are fundamentally invested in the system. They ought to recognize
that their primary financial interest is mass affluence: Profit depends on
companies’ ability to sell, which, in turn, requires customers, and for an
investor invested in the broad swathes of the economy, customers are
employees. Redistributing corporate gains to shareholders, in the medium
run, simply leads to classic demand-deficit recession, as underpaid
employees have trouble buying what they produce.
Even if it could be made consistent, the profit maximization faith has
little support in the law. A century ago, corporate law statutes abandoned
any attempt to restrict corporate form to socially useful purposes. Today,
they consistently permit a corporation to be formed for any legal purpose
and grant the board near plenary power to pursue corporate interests as the
board perceives them, with no reference to profit at all.
In short, we live in a system that largely authorizes corporate elites to
do as they please. Courts combine extraordinary judicial deference with
9. The fictional shareholders for whose profit firms purportedly should be operated are
implicitly described as if they have no interests other than their shares. This picture is highly
implausible. An investor holding both shares and bonds of the same company might prefer the
interests of its bonds over its shares. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (barring corporate directors from considering interests of
bondholders, despite evidence that bondholders and shareholders were largely the same entities).
Diversified shareholders will have a greater interest in publicly traded firms than any particular
firm, while traders may be more interested in price volatility than in the firm’s success. See
generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996) [hereinafter Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders]. Ordinary middle-class citizen investors are likely to have far more interest in the
overall success of the economy, employee prosperity, and consumer prices than in the price of any
particular share. Id. Moreover, traders using modern derivatives can easily profit from the firm’s
losses as well as its gains, or separate their vote from their economic interest. See Henry Hu &
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (describing mechanisms by which stock market players can control
corporate votes without the associated economic risk of shareholding).
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hortatory demands to focus on profit, backed up by markets that,
themselves, ordinarily easily tolerate inadequate performance but
sporadically become harshly unforgiving.
In this Part I, I address a few of the principles of corporate law and its
associated culture most relevant to insolvency and the bankruptcy regime.
The central theme is the incoherence of the profit-maximization norm, both
sociologically and as applied by the courts.
A. THE MYSTERY OF PROFIT
The conventional wisdom, repeated in news articles, accounting and
Master of Business Administration (MBA) classes, popular films, and
judicial dicta, is that business corporations should and do maximize
profits. 10 Unfortunately, the profit maximization norm is both confused and
indefensible; there is no reason to think that a moral commitment to greed
will lead to good results. Indeed, as Enron dramatically demonstrated, there
is no reason to think that a commitment to profit maximization will even
lead to profits; often it simply leads to fraud.11
If a business can sell its product or services for more than it must pay
for its various human, physical and financial inputs, it generates an
economic surplus. Some uses of that surplus are considered to be out of
profits: payments of dividends for financial capital, purchases of other
companies, or large-scale investment in physical capital for expansion.
Others reduce accounting profits. For example, accountants will view the
corporation’s profits as lower if management uses its surplus to reduce the
prices charged to corporate consumers 12 or increases payments (through
10. See, e.g., WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987) (film clip available at https://www.ame
ricanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechwallstreet.html) (Gordon Gekko speech, “Greed is
good”).
11. Enron management was famously so focused on stock price that its stock ticker was
displayed throughout the headquarters. See, e.g., Mimi Swartz, How Enron Blew It, TEXAS
MONTHLY (Nov. 2001), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/how-enron-blew-it/. It seems
highly likely that this focus led directly to its tolerance for sharp trading, misleading disclosures
and outright fraud. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad,
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 775 (2004) (the profit maximization norm requires that managers learn
to be cynics in order to betray their teammate employees; predictably, they also betray anonymous
investors). For discussions of Enron, see generally, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND,
THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON
(Portfolio; Reprint edition, 2013); NANCY RAPOPORT ET AL., ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE
FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 72–74, 125, 130, 287, 159, 163 (2009)
(summarizing Enron’s massively misleading accounting and use of stock options that gave
executives strong incentives to increase share price; greed and opportunism are expected in
corporate leadership but got out of hand at Enron; stock price was a powerful motivator; Enron’s
deceptions led to low cost of capital; Enron employee said “our job was to take advantage of the
law to make as much money as we can;” top management conveyed impression that key objective
was to book paper profits).
12. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), discussed below, suggests that such a
distribution of profit would be improper if not done with the goal of increasing shareholder
dividends.
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higher prices or greater consumption quantities) to corporate inputs in the
forms of wages or salary for labor, rents for land, taxes for government
services or interest for financial capital.
The distinctions between payments that reduce profits, and ones that do
not, often reflect the recipient: in general, payments to equity investors are
considered to be made out of profits, while payments to any other corporate
participant are viewed as reducing profit. However, this distinction is often
easily manipulated, in part because the various corporate roles are often
held by the same people. 13 For one well-known example, bondholders and
stockholders are, in general, the same diversified investment funds. Even
when they are not, issuers and investors alike can readily substitute one for
the other. In each case, anonymous savers aggregated through the financial
markets provide funds to the firm in return for more or less predictable
periodic payments subject to periodic renegotiation. The specific terms
differ. But, as Modigliani and Miller famously demonstrated over half a
century ago, and every finance student learns, the two forms are close
enough to be substitutes in many cases, allowing firm managers and
investors to substitute bonds (interest on which reduces profits) for stock
(dividends on which do not) or vice versa. 14
Similarly, a partnership reports payments to its key personnel as
distributions of profits, while a corporation reports the same payments as
wage and salary expenses reducing profit—unless the payments are in the
form of dividends (or, during the go-go years of the ‘90s and ‘00s, out-ofthe-money stock option grants), in which case they cease being expenses
and no longer reduce profits.
Again, if a corporation’s control parties wish to make charitable
contributions, the corporation may make the contributions itself, or it may
distribute dividends to its shareholders, or it may increase executive
compensation and they may make the contributions. 15 But these similar
13. Prior to check-the-box income taxation for closely held corporations, see Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(b) (1996), closely held corporations routinely sought to recharacterize corporate
surplus in order to avoid reporting taxable corporate profit.
14. That bonds and stock are largely interchangeable is the underpinning of the Modigliani and
Miller independence propositions, taught to every beginning finance student, that the value of a
firm, under “perfect” capital markets and without taxes, is independent of whether it is financed
by debt or equity, and that under similar conditions investors should be indifferent as to whether
corporate surplus is paid out as dividends, interest or reinvested in the firm. See, e.g., IVO WELCH,
CORPORATE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 578 (2009); Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261
(1958); Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and The Cost of Capital: A
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2010) (permitting corporation to make charitable
donations). See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 59–61 (Del. 1991) (approving settlement of
derivative action challenging Occidental Petroleum’s financing of an art museum in honor of its
CEO on the ground that board’s decision would be protected by business judgment rule);
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that Delaware
corporations may make “reasonable” charitable contributions). While the duty of loyalty bars
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behaviors are treated differently by law and accounting: the corporate
contribution and increased executive compensation reduce the firm’s profits
and taxes, while dividends to allow shareholder contributions do not.
Accounting and legal conventions also do not track economic reality in
other areas. Indeed, often a company that does not replace its plant before it
becomes obsolete, abandons research and development, or does not spend
on quality control will show an immediate increase in reported profit as its
expenses decline. But as a matter of economic reality, by failing to make
investments necessary to make its sales sustainable, the firm is disinvesting.
In effect, it is eating its seed corn. The current “profits” are not economic
surplus at all.
Similarly, any costs that the firm is legally permitted to avoid will not
reduce accounting profits—even though from a social perspective they
clearly reduce the social surplus, if any, produced by the firm. For example,
the costs of production of oil include cleanup costs of spills, political
instability and war in the Middle East, particulate pollution and associated
disease in areas with heavy usage, global climate change from carbon
emissions, and the social costs of building automobile rather than transit
and pedestrian infrastructure (including the high cost of urban housing
resulting from excess demand for the few areas served by transit). Few of
these costs are legal obligations of oil producing or consuming firms and
therefore they are not reflected in accounting profits.
Finally, even when a corporation has accounting profits in a particular
accounting period, it is not required to distribute them to shareholders. 16
Stock market participants often assume that undistributed profits will
eventually accrue to shareholders’ benefit—they will be reinvested and
produce larger profits later and at some point, those profits will lead to
larger dividends or a final distribution if the company is sold. In the real
world, this assumption often fails. Indeed, since competitive markets tend to
force prices to marginal cost and the marginal cost of a dividend is zero,
firms in competitive markets generally will have no choice but to distribute
surplus to consumers (as lower prices) rather than to shareholders (as
dividends). Even in less competitive markets, investments may not have the
anticipated returns, or, as we have seen, management may decide to
distribute any retained surplus to other corporate participants.

executives from operating a firm for their personal advantage and executive compensation
therefore ought to be in proportion to the executive’s service, the courts are remarkably deferential
to board decisions. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 779 (Del. Ch.
2005) (reviewing high compensation for failed executive under deferential standard).
16. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989); see infra
note 26.
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B. THE PROFIT GOAL
Profit maximization, thus, conveys a general sense that corporations
ought to be run in the interests of shareholders rather than other
participants, but is highly ambiguous in its details. Indeed, short-term
shareholder profit and long-term corporate success are rarely congruent. A
firm that seeks to maximize accounting profits by minimizing expenses
such as quality control, advertising, or legal compliance, or makes a routine
practice of squeezing employees or suppliers, or deceiving customers, is
highly likely to injure, not improve, its profits over the firm’s life
expectancy. The lesson of Enron may well be that true economic success,
like happiness, is most likely to come to those who do not seek it directly. 17
Ambiguities aside, the conventional wisdom is clear: managers are
expected to profit-maximize at the expense of nearly every other value.
Perhaps the most famous statement of this view is found in Dodge v.
Ford. 18 The Dodge court, after reiterating the deference courts owe to the
decisions of corporate boards, famously stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself,
to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. . . . [I]t is not
within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the
affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders
and for the primary purpose of benefiting others . . . . 19

While the court permitted Ford to continue reducing its prices below
what the market would bear, the court said it was allowing Ford to do so
only because expanding the business was likely to ultimately benefit the
shareholders—not because the interests of customers or employees (as
understood by Ford’s board) were entitled to any consideration. Indeed, the
court notes approvingly, as evidence that the board was properly pursuing
the interests of shareholders, that the company was able to fund its
expansion entirely on the backs of shareholders and ordinary employees—
shareholders received their regular dividend and “the very considerable

17. VIKTOR FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1959) (arguing that meaning and other
directedness, not self-preservation, was the best route to survival in the concentration camps); see
generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 773 (2004) (arguing that pursuit of profit leads to cynical managers, which, in turn is
antithetical to profit).
18. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (maintaining that corporate customers
and employees have no interests that corporate board may consider independent of shareholder
profit).
19. Id.
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salaries paid to Mr. Ford and to certain executive officers and employees
were not diminished.” 20
On this view, employees and customers are merely tools for the benefit
of the shareholders, not ends in themselves. The company may act in their
interests, as its board perceives them, only if so acting is a means to the end
of shareholder profit. A fortiori, customer or employee views as to their
interests or desires are entitled to no weight whatsoever.
To be sure, Dodge itself is an outlier. 21 The statutes explicitly contradict
Dodge, stating that a business corporation may be formed for any legal
purpose, without reference to shareholder profit, 22 and explicitly granting
every corporation, “the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs,” 23 including
using its funds for matters that clearly do not increase shareholder returns in
any narrow sense, such as making “donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific or educational purposes” or “in aid of governmental
authority.” 24 Moreover, cases ordinarily are far more deferential to
managers and directors, even when managers obviously are not primarily
concerned with short-term shareholder returns. 25
Still, Dodge accurately reflects a widespread view that businesses ought
to be managed solely to maximize profit, or (somewhat different)
shareholder returns, even if the courts will not enforce this duty—that, as
Milton Friedman perversely contended, the only social responsibility of
business is profits 26 and managers ought to set aside all other concerns,
including the welfare of employees, consumers, the environment or even
the capitalist market system itself. Even the most deferential judicial
opinions tend to repeat the shareholder profit goal while declaring it
effectively unenforceable in court.
Thus, for example, in Paramount v. Time, 27 a much more typical case,
the Delaware Supreme Court offered hortatory support for the profit
maximization goal, even while rendering the board’s duty unenforceable in
the courts. As in Dodge, board members testified to goals other than
maximum profit, including preserving what insiders referred to as “Time
20. Id.
21. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,

166 (2008).
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2010) (“A corporation may be incorporated or
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . .”).
23. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02 (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973).
24. Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 302 (m), (n) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973). Accord
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122(9), (12) (2010).
25. See infra pp. 11–13.
26. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine – The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
27. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989) (holding that
Time’s board’s plan to merge with Warner was subject only to deferential review under the
business judgment rule).
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Culture” or “separation of church and state” (the separation of editorial and
advertising staff) in order to maintain the “journalistic integrity” of Time
Magazine. 28 Here, however, the court does not criticize these statements of
purpose or even subject them to any critical analysis. 29 Instead, the Time
court declared:
[The] broad mandate [of 8 Del.C. § 141(a)] includes a conferred authority
to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to
enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, are obliged to
chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard
to a fixed investment horizon. Second, [when Revlon is inapplicable] a
board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is
not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term
. . . . The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the
selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. 30

Time’s directors, accordingly, were required to “promote the
corporation’s interests,” which the court seems to view as interchangeable
with “enhanc[ing] corporate profitability.” But they were not required to
provide any evidence that their plans would have these results and explicitly
were not required to “maximize shareholder value in the short term.”
Rather, the court effectively grants the board near total autonomy to define
the corporate “interest.”
First, the board has complete control over timing and need not even
pretend to believe that its plans will maximize share value in any defined
time frame or relative to any identified alternative. 31 On the contrary, the
court affirmatively held that a board is entitled to set the time frame in
which it seeks profits. But as Lewis Carroll’s White Queen taught us, when
a manager offers jam every other day, it can mean that “the rule is jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam to-day.” 32 The power to defer is
the power to deny; the court’s obeisance to profit maximization is entirely
precatory.
Moreover, it is commonplace that short-term profit often conflicts with
long-term success. Success depends on loyal and trusting employees and
28. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *4 (Del. Ch. A.2d
July 14, 1989) (noting that “transcendent goal” of the Time board included “a desire to maintain
. . . what management and the board regarded as distinctive and important ‘Time culture’
[including a] distinctive structure that is intended to protect journalistic integrity from pressures
from the business side of the enterprise”).
29. A more critical court might have questioned the testimony that the corporate purpose of the
publisher of People Magazine and Sports Illustrated was to maintain “journalistic integrity” or that
this goal explained the planned merger. See, e.g., Time, WL 79880, at *7. In any event, the court’s
recitation of the lengthy course of negotiations presented ample circumstantial evidence that
executive prerogatives and empire building were far more salient drivers of the transaction.
30. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150, 1154.
31. Id. at 1153 (stating the board, not court, should determine what is a “better” deal for firm).
32. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 174 (Oxford World’s Classics 2009) (ebook).
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customers, and, of course, a surrounding culture that encourages citizens to
expect that they will be treated properly. 33 That kind of trust is hard to build
and easy to destroy. Accordingly, any arguably socially useful decision is
defensible as long-term profit maximization. The court acknowledges this
reality, appropriately refusing to require a board to limit its considerations
to profit in any narrow sense—it may, for example, take “Time Culture” as
one of its goals. In short, the consequence of the Time holding is that boards
may freely determine and change the corporate purpose so long as they
appropriately invoke the requisite pieties and avoid “Revlon mode” 34 or
self-interested actions that would eliminate the protections of the business
judgment rule.
The legal reality of the holding is that Time was entitled to ignore
shareholder returns to further a purported goal of preserving of an illdefined “culture.” If this is all that is required of corporate boards, the case
law parallels the statutory language: business corporations may be operated
for any lawful purpose—ranging from creating good jobs or a quality
product, satisfying (or creating) consumer desires for quasi-addictive
nicotine or sugar, improving the national quality of life and/or profit, not
doing evil, to preserving rain forests.
Still, the Delaware Supreme Court recapitulates and reinforces the
widespread view that the highest goal of the board is “corporate
profitability.” 35 Even as it allows deviations on the flimsiest of rationales,
the court adds its voice to legitimize the social constraints on boards:
rhetorically, if not mandatorily, their job is to consider profit, not social
good.

33. The literature on the economic importance of trust is vast. For examples, see, e.g., Samuel
Bowles & Sandra Polanía-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or
Complements?, 50(2) J. ECON. LITERATURE 368 (2012); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring
Trust, 155(3) Q. J. ECON 811, 811(2000); Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High Quality Growth:
What They Are and How to Acquire Them (NBER Working Paper No. 7540, 2000); Rafael La
Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5864, 1996), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5864.pdf; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST:
THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 5 (1996); see generally RODERICK M.
KRAMER & TOM R. TYLER, TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1995); Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973).
34. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(stating that when company is for sale or sale or breakup has become inevitable (so-called
“Revlon Mode”), board has an enforceable duty to disregard other goals in favor of share price
maximization). In Revlon, an earlier transaction had exchanged shares for bonds; the court makes
clear that the board was not permitted to consider the actual financial interests of actual
shareholders which also held bonds. Rather, in Revlon Mode, the board must consider only the
purely fictional interests of shareholders as shareholders, pretending that they have no other
interests, financial or otherwise, in the firm or the broader economy.
35. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
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C. CORPORATE PURPOSE WITHIN THE PROFIT-SEEKING
PARADIGM: SELF-COLONIZATION
Managers (and their critics) largely argue about specific strategies
within this profit-seeking paradigm. Within particular companies, managers
may seek specific solutions to specific problems—for example, by seeking
to improve morale or to integrate new technologies, make legacy systems
work together, or use financial engineering to improve reported earnings
and, presumably, stock price. Those solutions, however, are no more ends
in themselves than is employee well-being or customer satisfaction. Within
the profit maximization framework, management is supposed to make its
goal profit maximization. Organizing the firm efficiently to produce a
useful product, improving morale, or contributing towards making America
great are fine intermediate aims if they lead to profit. However, if instead
profit requires ending a favorite project, exploiting customer trust, or even
dissolving the firm, managers are expected to be prepared to abandon their
prior commitments at any time. Indeed, the pursuit of profit seems to justify
managers’ use of firm resources to reduce the firm’s contribution towards
the public fisc, such as paying investors via tax-deductible interest instead
of after-tax dividends. It may even shift profits to tax havens or injure the
American economy by shifting production to jurisdictions with relaxed
controls on pollution or safety, anti-union measures, or simply lower wages.
Corporate law is similarly conflicted about the roles and responsibilities
of employees, especially top managers. As the Time case illustrates, courts
defer almost completely to boards of directors, allowing them near plenary
power over the firm. 36 Boards, in turn, routinely delegate their power to the
36. Judicial review is effectively limited to a handful of circumstances. In the ordinary course,
the board’s decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, allowing the board to make
arguably wrong and even negligent decisions without fear of a court “substitut[ing] its judgment
for that of the board if the latter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”
Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). The business judgment rule does not apply in a handful
of narrowly defined situations. First, actual self-enrichment at the expense of the corporation,
which is reviewed as a breach of the duty of loyalty. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701,710 (Del. 1983) (holding that conflict of interest and self-dealing transactions between a
corporation and its top managers or directors are not void but will be reviewed for “entire
fairness” and upheld only if they provide fair value to the corporation). Second, change of control
transactions, where the board is presumed to have a conflict of interest leading to heightened
scrutiny. See Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d, at 956 (mandating elevated standard of review for
defensive measures). Third, when the board causes or permits the corporation to violate the law,
courts may review less deferentially. See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d
Cir. 1974) (applying NY law). However, even massive fraud does not automatically lead to
judicial intervention. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369, 372 (Del. 2006) (holding
directors to a “good faith” standard, i.e., that they must have minimal mechanisms in place to
discover illegality, although the mechanisms need not be effective). Finally, if the board puts the
company up for sale, or sale or dissolution becomes inevitable, the Revlon doctrine states that the
board’s duty changes to maximizing the return to shares in the particular transaction. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d, at 182.
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firm’s CEO and other top employees, retaining only the power to hire and
fire and set pay for those at the very top. All employees, from the CEO on
down, are subject to the ordinary agency rule that servants may be
discharged at will, even in violation of employment contracts. 37 For
employees below the level of the CEO, that power of discharge ordinarily is
vested in their immediate superior. Accordingly, no employee is in a good
position to criticize the firm leadership, play the role of a loyal opposition
or otherwise decline to be a “team player” going along with top
management’s plans. The firm is organized internally as a sort of
dictatorship with the board in the role of tribunes empowered to
periodically review the dictator’s actions and, if they so determine, remove
him. 38
The CEO, or the CEO and directors, may be dictators, but they are a
peculiar type of dictator. Law and social pressures alike agree that both
board members and managers owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the firm.
They are expected to work for the firm, not themselves. Managers, even top
managers who are founders or large shareholders, remain employees of the
corporation and thus, like all employees, are its servants. In turn, a servant
is obligated to work for the master’s benefit, setting aside any conflicting
interests the servant may have. 39
37. The U.S. norm is that non-unionized employees below the top executive level are “at will”
and may be terminated at any time. Unionized and civil service employees sometimes have greater
rights. Top executives typically have employment contracts. However, the firm may still sever the
employment relationship for any reason; the only effect of the contract is to give the wrongfully
terminated manager a claim for money damages.
38. If the top managers also control a voting majority of the stock, no one in the system has the
ability to question or challenge their actions. See Kara Swisher, A Wise Man Leaves Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/opinion/facebook-instagramsystrom.html (describing Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s reluctance to allow dissent); Evan
Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy, THE NEW YORKER
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fixfacebook-before-it-breaks-democracy (similar). Even when managers do not have controlling
blocks of stock, the “Wall Street Rule” (that shareholders who are unhappy with current
management’s actions should sell their stock) and the basic Berle and Means passivity of
dispersed shareholders assure that nearly all of the time, current shareholders will support
incumbents. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, MODERN
CORPORATION IN PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (arguing that shareholders no longer had the control
rights of owners in public corporations). For further discussion, see generally William W. Bratton,
Jr., The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revisited: Gardiner Means and the
Administered Price, UNIV. PA., INST. FOR LAW & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 18–29 (Sept. 5, 2018);
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century
American Legal Thought, 30(1) L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005); Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders, supra note 9.
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 3D, § 8.01 GENERAL FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE (AM.
LAW. INST. 2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all
matters connected with the agency relationship”); RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 3D, § 8.05 USE OF
PRINCIPAL’S PROPERTY (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (“An agent has a duty (1) not to use property of
the principal for the agent’s own purposes . . . .); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546, 548
(N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. . . .
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Management is granted great power and directed to use it in the
“interests of the corporation,” loosely understood as “corporate
profitability.” Corporate profits, in turn, require selling the company’s
services or products for more than the cost of production. This is another
way of saying that the firm must seek to take as much as possible while
giving as little as possible to consumers, suppliers, lenders, employees and
society’s tax collectors. The profit motive requires the firm to treat its
constituents, the very people who make it possible, as if they were
outsiders, colonial subjects rather than citizens, to be exploited for the
benefits they can provide.
At the same time, the duty of loyalty requires managers, while
extracting the most they can from those they deal with on a daily basis, to
themselves abandon any notion of personal profit. 40 They must be entirely
selfless in their profit-seeking selfishness—true colonial administrators
abjuring personal corruption in order to serve the greater cause. Except that
the cause is not the glory of the motherland, but instead mere profit for
anonymous stock market players.
D. THE CYNICISM OF PROFIT
To accomplish their designated profit-maximizing task, managers must
treat their co-workers and firm customers with deep cynicism. The only
way to get maximum cooperation and productivity from employees is to
persuade them that they are part of a common enterprise; similarly,
customers must be convinced that the company is not simply seeking to rob
them. It is no surprise then, that managers like to call employees
“associates” or “partners” as if they were equals rather than subordinates, or
that they repeat aphorisms, such as “the customer is always right,” even
while being quite certain of the contrary. Profit maximization requires that
customer or employee-centered concerns be an illusion and a lie, much as
the logic of colonialism inevitably demonstrates the “white man’s burden”
or the “mission civilisatrice” to be simply more sophisticated extraction
methods, pleasanter and probably more profitable than the violence of the
Belgian Congo (but no more aimed at the interests of the colonial subjects).
A profit-maximizing company treats its participants and customers well
only to the extent that it expects that good treatment will enable it to extract
more from them. Under profit-maximization norms, employees and

Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of self was to be renounced, however hard
the abnegation.”).
40. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF AGENCY, § 8.01 GENERAL FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE (AM. LAW.
INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT THIRD OF AGENCY, § 8.05 USE OF PRINCIPAL’S PROPERTY (AM.
LAW. INST. 2006); Salmon, 164 N.E. at 548.
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customers are not part of the team but opponents—every penny that they
receive is a penny that reduces profits. 41
Employees of a firm work together to produce the firm’s products or
services. It might seem, then, that they should be paid as participants in a
joint enterprise, sharing in the benefits they have jointly created.42 Such
explanations of pay appear from time to time in the academic literature.43
But the corporate law analysis is different. Under our business law,
employees are agents (servants) of the firm and therefore, as a matter of
law, what they produce belongs to the firm. 44 Since what they produce does
not belong to them, it cannot be the justification for their pay.
Similarly, workers in a capitalist society are expected to look out for
their own interests; they produce social benefits indirectly by directly
pursuing personal wealth. 45 But as a legal matter, corporate employees,
from the lowest paid to the CEO, are servants of the corporation, bound to
set aside their own interest and act on behalf of the firm. Therefore, they
cannot defend their pay on the Lockean grounds that they made it by
combining their labor or effort or intelligence with raw materials,46 or by
George Washington Plunkitt’s classic line: “I seen my opportunities and I
took ‘em.” 47 Either of these conventional entrepreneurial positions would
be clearly improper. 48
41. See, e.g., DANIEL J.H. GREENWOOD, TEAM SPIRIT: DOING BAD THINGS IN THE CAUSE OF
GOOD, in THE RANGE OF EVIL: MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN HUMAN WICKEDNESS 5
(William A. Myers, ed., INTERDISCIPLINARY PRESS, 2006); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Discussing
Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting Norms of Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1235 (2005).
42. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch 5, para. 27 (Thomas
Peardon, ed. 1952 at 17) (1690) (arguing that since each man owns his own labor, when he mixes
it with natural matter, it becomes his property).
43. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1998)
(arguing for shareholder supremacy on ground that employees would find democratic control
difficult); see, e.g., Margaret Blain & Lynn Stout, Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 248, 263 (1999) (arguing that firms create hierarchy to overcome the difficulties of
determining individual contributions to the firm product).
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD OF AGENCY, § 8.02 MATERIAL BENEFIT ARISING OUT OF
POSITION (AM. LAW. INST. 2006); Speck v. N.C. Dairy Found., Inc., 319 S.E.2d 139, 144 (N.C.
1984) (holding that employee’s non-patentable invention belonged to employer in absence of
contract to contrary).
45. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS Book I, Ch. II (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. . . . Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his
fellow-citizens.”).
46. LOCKE, supra note 42.
47. WILLIAM RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL: A SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS ON
VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS, DELIVERED BY EX-SENATOR GEORGE WASHINGTON PLUNKITT, THE
TAMMANY PHILOSOPHER, FROM HIS ROSTRUM, THE NEW YORK COUNTY COURT-HOUSE
BOOTBLACK STAND 3 (1905) (reissued 1963).
48. The product of an employee’s labor belongs to the employer, not the employee. Similarly,
the agent’s duty of loyalty bars the agent from acting in pure self-interest. See, e.g., Unocal Corp
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
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Instead, managers justify pay for their subordinates and themselves on
the ground that the pay is necessary to attract and retain them, or is
calculated to lead them to work harder or more competently. Pay is not
defended by pointing out that employees are “We the People,” so that
employee pay is the same as social good, the reason why “Governments are
instituted among men” 49 and indeed, one of the primary reasons why
corporations are legal in the first place. Instead, pay is seen as, in effect, an
investment expected to lead to more profit for the firm. For this reason,
courts, prior to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), consistently had trouble understanding the concept of a
pension as deferred compensation. Since the pensioner was no longer
contributing to the firm, courts saw the pension as unnecessary to induce
work and therefore a gift lacking the consideration necessary to make it a
contractual obligation. 50
Indeed, the received wisdom appears to be that we must offer those at
the very top ever larger pay (and ever lower taxes) in order to motivate
them to do their jobs. Even the Delaware Chancery Court has stated that
directors ought to hold stock in the companies they supervise in order to
improve their “incentives.” 51 This view reflects an astonishing lack of
confidence in the professionalism of the professionals who operate
institutions that are among our most important. If they cannot be trusted to
act responsibly unless they have “skin in the game,” 52 then presumably
judges like Chancellor Strine, for whom such material rewards would be
corruption, cannot be trusted either. And if directors must have such “skin”
because they are acting solely out of self-interest, why would anyone expect
them to not cheat or steal for personal benefit, given the generally low level
of safeguards and the high potential rewards?
Increased wages at the top are said to improve incentives. For most
other employees, higher wages are perceived differently: in the
conventional view, increased wages are an inflationary threat that might
reduce incentives to work, so they should be fought by raising interest rates
and weakening unions. Were we to take the opposite view—that the
purpose of profits is to entice, at the lowest possible price, finance capital so
that we can maximize the number of good jobs—we might well get higher
growth (as we did in the years following the Second World War), because
we would have a broader base of affluent consumers. A mass consumer
base would reduce the likelihood of demand-deficit (or “savings glut”)
49. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
50. See generally JAMES WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004).
51. See, e.g., In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *10, 10 n. 47
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (citing academic articles contending that directors will not have
“incentives” to do their duty without equity holdings).
52. Id. at 10.
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recessions, since the middle class saves relatively little. At the same time,
such a middle-class led economy would probably have fewer problems with
inflation. The middle class is more likely to demand the sorts of goods and
services that we know how to produce cheaply and in scale, in contrast to
upper-class demand for “Veblen goods.” 53 Effective middle-class demand
for housing leads to higher employment and better housing; demand for the
largest house on the fanciest beach or the highest building in Manhattan just
drives prices upward. 54
Even conservative theorist Edmund Burke, denouncing the French
Revolution, saw the affluence of a population as a chief test of the success
of government. 55 Corporate law, and the conventional wisdom it reflects,
beg to disagree. In the world of corporate law, ordinary Americans are, as it
were, colonial subjects, tools to an end that is not their own—someone
else’s profit. In short, our own interests and values—even those of us who
own shares—are irrelevant.
Fundamentally, however, the profit goal puts managers in an awkward
and cynical position. To succeed, a corporation must outcompete markets
that, as Ronald Coase pointed out, perform for free the managerial functions
of information assimilation and direction.56 Corporations have two principal
mechanisms to do this: centralized planning by command and control
hierarchies, or cooperation and team spirit. The former is generally
acknowledged to be inefficient, if only because superiors must rely on
subordinates to supply information and to carry out orders. 57 Accordingly,
successful managers routinely appeal to cooperation and group competition
to convince employees to sacrifice—or at least work hard—for the
corporation team.

53. Veblen goods are luxuries for which demand rises as prices increase. The name is a
reference to Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption, which contends that most consumption
beyond subsistence levels is for the purpose of demonstrating status. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS 75–76 (1899). When demand is based on pursuit of status, the item or service is
valuable only because it is not available to the masses.
54. As income and wealth are redistributed upward, status-marker goods such as the highest
high rise, the best seats in the ballpark, or the most elite prep school are subject to massive
inflation since, by definition, it’s not possible to create more without destroying the scarcity that is
the source of their value. See generally THOMAS H. FRANK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY:
WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1996).
55. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 146, 148 (The Liberal
Arts Press, Inc. 1955) (“Among the standards upon which the effects of government on any
country are to be estimated, I must consider the state of its population as not the least certain. No
country in which population flourishes and is in progressive improvement can be under a very
mischievous government. . . . The wealth of a country is another, and no contemptible, standard
by which we may judge whether, on the whole, a government be protecting or destructive.”).
56. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 401 ECONOMICA 386–405 (1937).
57. For an early example of this commonplace observation, see LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND
PEACE Book 9, Ch. 1 (1867).
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But even while managers are trying to convince employees to be team
players, the profit maximization norm simultaneously requires managers to
remember that the same employees are costs to the corporation to be
minimized whenever possible. They, or we, are not the goal of the firm but
its opposition, not its citizens but its subjects. Managers, then, are expected
to be double agents, as ready to betray a team as to build it. Perhaps as a
result, one has the impression that many firms have promotion policies
which, intentionally or otherwise, select for a degree of ruthless selfinterest. 58 Presumably, pay-driven, self-interested, competitive individuals
are less likely to develop the genuine relationships with co-workers that
might make betrayal harder, and therefore are more likely to succeed in this
intensely cynical game.
E. FROM CYNICS TO SELFLESS SAINTS
Cynicism, however, is only the first part of the story. As noted above,
corporate leaders, as fiduciaries, are barred from betraying their co-workers
for their own benefit. 59 Rather, having faked loyalty in order to extract
effort from their co-workers, the self-interested cynics must convert to
selfless saints, acting with “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,”
voluntarily to turn over their ill-gotten gains to the anonymous institutional
investors of the stock market. 60

58. It is difficult to know how one would verify or falsify this impression. But anecdotes
certainly support it. Consider a completely arbitrary list including the recent rash of scandals
involving executives apparently coercing subordinates into sex, from Harvey Weinstein to
American Apparel’s Dov Charney. See, e.g., Hadley Freeman, American Apparel founder Dov
Charney: ‘Sleeping with people you work with is unavoidable’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/sep/10/american-apparel-dov-charney-sexualharassment; see generally MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (W. W. Norton & Company; Reprint
edition, 2010) (noting examples of repeated stories of difficult-to-deal-with executives); Mike
Isaac, Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html (explaining the
forced departure of Uber’s Kalanick after sexual harassment allegations); Andrew Ross Sorkin,
This Tyco Videotape Has Been Edited for Content, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/28/business/this-tyco-videotape-has-been-edited-forcontent.html (noting the extraordinary outright fraud in executive suites uncovered in each
downturn, epitomized by Tyko’s Dennis Kozlowski’s ice sculpture of a urinating David); Alan
Deutschman, Is Your Boss a Psychopath?, FAST CO. (July 1, 2005), https://www.fastc
ompany.com/53247/your-boss-psychopath (noting the infamous restructuring tactics of
“Chainsaw Al” Dunlap). Or, for a more traditional version of power corrupting, consider Angelo
Mozilo’s combination of political bribery and mass exploitation of vulnerable borrowers at
Countrywide Financial. See Connie Bruck, Angelo’s Ashes, The NEW YORKER, June 29, 2009,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/29/angelos-ashes.
59. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Joint adventurers, like
copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.”).
60. Id. In Justice Cardozo’s memorable language, fiduciaries—partners in the Meinhard case,
but corporate directors and top executives as well—are “held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place . . . . [They serve] in a position in which thought of self [is] to be renounced,
however hard the abnegation.” Id. at 546, 548.
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I say “voluntarily” advisedly. Shareholders have no legal entitlement to
a dividend. Rather, they rely on the normative expectation that directors and
managers are supposed to declare them, enforced by constant repetition in
schools, the press and relevant social circles.
Beyond this social norm sits little. Shareholders ordinarily cannot
invoke the power of the courts to demand a dividend; legally, the defining
characteristic of a dividend is that it is not a contractual right until the board
declares it. 61 Courts guard the autonomy of directors to determine the time
frame in which to pursue profit or to turn over corporate funds to
shareholders. 62
As a result, as a practical matter, the only coercive power that
shareholders have to force a dividend is the so-called market for corporate
control—the possibility that stock market participants (shareholders and
non-shareholders alike) will bid down the stock price to the point where a
prospective buyer will find it attractive to purchase enough shares to vote
out the incumbent directors. This has not been much of a threat since the
mid-1990s: incumbent directors are entitled to use the funds and powers of
the corporation to repel insurgents, including by methods such as staggered
boards and poison pills that make it nearly impossible for any outsider to
accumulate a control block of stock without managerial consent. 63
What is left is moral suasion. Directors give corporate surplus to
investors (via dividends or stock buybacks) because they think it is what
they are supposed to do, not because anyone can force them to do it. It
remains an open question to what extent or for how long this normative
expectation will be able to overcome the powerful forces aligned against it.
Will top managers who have risen to their position by betraying their
colleagues consistently accept a moral obligation to share their gains with
anonymous investors, or will they increasingly find ways to divert corporate
profits to themselves?

61. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2010) (specifying conditions under which directors
“may” declare a dividend); Gabelli & Co., Inc. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del.
1984) (“It is settled law in this State that the declaration and payment of a dividend rests in the
discretion of the corporation’s board of directors in the exercise of its business judgment [and
courts will intervene only in cases of fraud or oppression].”).
62. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989), discussed
infra note 26.
63. Versata Enter., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010) (upholding combination
of staggered board and poison pill as not “preclusive” even though it made hostile takeover
virtually impossible in short term); Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995)
(upholding “just say no” defense by holding that directors may “protect its stockholders from
offers that do not reflect the long-term value of the corporation under its present management plan
. . . [and may] properly employ[ ] a poison pill as a proportionate defensive response to protect its
stockholders from a ‘low ball’ [offer].”); Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955–56 (Del. 1985) (setting out standard of review for defensive measures).
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F. ABSOLUTISTS RUNNING SCARED
In short, in the ordinary course, corporate managers—the CEO and
subordinates—have near total discretion, virtually exempt from judicial
review. The near universal practice of a single bureaucratic hierarchy
culminating in a CEO, all of whose subordinates serve at his pleasure,
ensures that top management will be largely unfettered by meaningful
countervailing powers within the bureaucracy. Therefore, while the board
has real power to replace the CEO, it lacks the basic internal information to
exercise that power sensibly. Flying blind, it usually must depend on
information from the CEO himself, subordinates willing to put their own
careers at risk by defying the boss, or outsiders such as market analysts. The
CEO retains a degree of authority that would have pleased King James.
Meanwhile, insecure and dependent subordinates, as every student of
political theory since Aristotle has understood, make the likelihood that
CEO or board can receive honest advice or accurate information
vanishingly small.
Nonetheless, managers and boards alike often run scared, acting less
like all-powerful sovereigns with unlimited power to silence and exclude
dissidents, than like slaves to the latest market fashions. The CEO serves at
the pleasure of the board; 64 the board is elected by the stockholders’
meeting, typically on a basis of one vote per share; 65 and shares (with their
votes) are freely bought and sold 66 at prices that reflect some combination
of speculation regarding future corporate payouts, so-called control premia,
and speculation regarding future stock market returns.
Ultimate control, thus, rests in the stock market, which at any time
could drive the price of a vote down to the point where an active investor
would find it attractive to purchase control of the board. The consumer and
producer markets may be similarly harsh taskmasters, at least to the extent
that the firm is subject to competitive pressures there. However, most
corporations with publicly traded stock can be expected to have some
monopoly power or similar protection from consumer market forces.
Competitive markets drive prices down to marginal cost; any firm that paid
dividends would have marginal cost and prices that are higher than its
competitors and would be driven out of business. There would be little
reason for a passive investor to buy stock in a firm that is not expected to
ever declare a dividend, so investors in the public market, if they are not
entirely irrational, must believe that the firm has a way to escape the
competitive dynamic.
To the extent that ultimate control rests in the stock market, it remains
as fraught as the conflicts between discretion and fiduciary duty or the
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2010).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a).
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various contradictory understandings of the profit imperative. Indeed, the
stock market fractally reproduces the conflicts we have seen already. Stock
markets simultaneously take far longer and shorter-term perspectives than
any human being: investment portfolios, having no life cycle or anticipated
death, can invest for the longest possible term, but they attract customers
based on short term performance and ever shorter-term trading. A primary
function of the stock market and the portfolios that dominate it is
diversification to eliminate firm-specific risk. A market made of portfolios
should ignore most of the diversifiable risks that are the central issues of
management, yet it moves in stampedes. Since any individual trader can
profit hugely by trading on information before others know it, traders
collectively make the stock market into a rapid aggregator of information.
Yet, actual stock price movements are often driven by fads and fashions and
self-referential inferences about its own behavior. 67
G. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL
MANAGERS (“SHAREHOLDERS” VS. MANAGERS)
Conventional wisdom refers to an “agency cost” problem, that
corporate managers might not be perfect representatives of shareholder
interests. The problem is misnamed and poorly theorized. Managers (but
not directors) are agents of the corporation, but neither managers nor
directors nor even the corporation are agents of shareholders.68
Shareholders themselves are largely institutional. 69 Debates about
whether “owners” should have more control than “managers” are really
about which set of managers ought to run the firm. There are several
67. On the self-referential or otherwise meaninglessness of many stock market price changes,
see, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 239 (3d ed. 2015); J. Bradford De Long
et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681 (1989); Robert
Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71
AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981).
68. Indeed, were shareholders to treat the corporation as if it were their agent, the courts would
conclude that the firm is not a corporation at all, and “pierce the veil” to deny shareholders the key
privilege of corporate law: entity (so-called “limited”) liability. See, e.g., Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry. Co. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“Dominion may be so complete, interference
so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary
an agent.”).
69. The Tax Policy Center estimated that in 2015, about 21% of the US stock market,
measured by capitalization, was held by households directly (i.e., not via mutual funds) in taxable
or non-taxable accounts. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, Tax Policy Center, The
Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, TAX POLICY CENTER, 927 T. 2 (2016),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000790-TheDwindling-Taxable-Share-of-U.S.-Corporate-Stock.pdf. These numbers appear to include nonpublicly traded stock, which likely increases the proportion of non-institutional shareholders. The
bulk of these individual holdings are probably controlled by a tiny group of ultra-wealthy
investors, and it is highly likely that most of it is professionally managed. The remainder of the
market is owned and controlled by institutions: largely pension funds, but also mutual funds,
hedge funds, insurance companies, endowments, and the like. Id. Almost a quarter is held by
foreigners, again primarily institutions. Id.
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reasons to think that shareholder managers will generally do a worse job:
first, expertise and experience, second, information and independence, and
third, fiduciary duty and fundamental commitments.
Shareholder-managers are trained to spot and trade on market
inefficiencies or to rebalance investment portfolios. 70 This is not obviously
relevant to operating a firm. On the contrary, modern investors are trained
to think about the risk and return of a portfolio of passive investments—not
about motivating large numbers of employees or ensuring that the
bureaucratic processes of information aggregation, planning and hierarchal
control lead to producing useful services that can be sold for more than their
cost of production.
Trading is transactional, short-term, and zero-sum: the past is no
predictor of the future, the counterparty is often anonymous and almost
always replaceable, and every dollar one trader makes is a dollar another
lost. For a trader, future prices are all that matters. The past is useful only to
the extent that it predicts the future and, especially to the extent that prices
already reflect existing information, often meaningless or threatens to be
misleading. For a trader, emotional commitments to a project or an
individual are merely sunk costs to be removed from consciousness,
however difficult the abnegation of ordinary modes of thinking.
These skills and habits are almost diametrically opposed to those of a
good institution builder; institutions, unlike markets, are always tied to their
own past, always path dependent, always dependent on long-term
commitments and relationships. The idea that traders will be better at
running companies than insiders with relevant skill and knowledge defies
the most basic logic of the division of labor.
Second, shareholder-managers tend to be tightly tied to the stock
market, if only because most portfolio managers, including active investors
such as hedge fund managers, are regularly and routinely evaluated by
comparison to stock market returns. Fail to beat the index, lose your job.
Since operating firms can only succeed by being different from the finance
markets, 71 tying firm decisions closely to stock price is doomed to fail. As
Enron showed, a firm trying to duplicate the finance markets internally is
likely to end up with the worst aspects of both systems. 72
Moreover, most proposals to shift power to shareholders will actually
shift power to the entire stock market. Prices are not set by shareholders but
by the finance market as a whole—buyers, sellers, holders, and those who
70. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2006).
71. Coase, supra note 56, at 393.
72. See generally, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE

ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2013); NANCY RAPOPORT &
JEFFREY VAN NIEL, ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL
READER (2009).

2018]

Corporate governance & Bankruptcy

123

decide to buy bonds instead. Making hostile takeovers easier or tying
managerial incentives more tightly to stock prices empowers prices, not
votes. Moreover, professional shareholders usually are prepared to sell at
the right price at any time (and may even have fiduciary obligations to their
own institutions or investors to do so). So even shareholder powers that are
actually restricted only to current holders of the company’s stock—such as
the right to vote for directors, say on pay, or authority to nominate directors
or make precatory or binding proposals without prior board consent—also
tend to empower the financial markets rather than affiliates of the particular
firm. If the right, or a particular exercise of it, is salient enough, the
shareholder base will shift to those who value it, without regard to any ongoing commitment to or connection with the firm. Non-shareholders are
always potential shareholders at the right price.
The financial markets, especially the institutional sector governed by
the teachings of modern corporate finance and legal fiduciary obligations
based on it, have fundamentally different commitments than any firm. The
primary function of financial markets is to match investors and savers with
different time and risk preferences: to allow firms, which need long term
funds to invest in particular, risky projects to use money from savers who
fear risk and want to be able to regain the use of their money independent of
the firm’s needs. On the one hand, the markets aggregate numerous small
investments to create the large sums that firms need. On the other hand,
they split the large, illiquid, long term investments that firms make into
small, transferable pieces, so that individual contributors can diversify their
own portfolios, eliminating the risk of any particular project, and can exit
when they wish without regard for the firm’s investment horizons.
A portfolio investor can shift the portfolio from one industry to another,
or one country to another, or one time frame to another, by a simple phone
call to a broker. Even the longest-term investor is essentially short-term in
that it need not have any ongoing commitment to any liquid investment: for
even a momentary profit, it may decide to sell a thirty-year bond or a
permanent equity investment and buy over-night paper. Its own time
frame—a pension, for example, is a permanent investor—need not have any
connection to the time frame of its investments—short-term commercial
paper, for example.
In contrast, the real capital investments of a firm are necessarily
bounded by time and place. An operating corporation, unlike a financial
investor, must commit to particular projects in particular places run by
particular people using particular skills and equipment.
To be sure, a corporation may finance long term real capital with shortterm borrowing regularly rolled over (or the reverse), even if this leaves it
more subject to possible downturns in the financial markets. Similarly,
corporate managers remake firms all the time—GE moves in and out of
finance as its primary activity; the American Can Company transforms
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itself into a financial conglomerate called Primerica and then is absorbed
into and later spun off by Citigroup; and Amazon moves from selling books
to providing the infrastructure for everyone selling on the internet.
Yet, the distinction remains. Financial investors can change time frame
or physical location at a moment’s notice, moving funds from the
Australian stock market (permanent financing) to the Norwegian overnight
loan market with almost no costs. In contrast, transforming a business takes
time. Moving physical plants often requires abandoning physical capital
before it is worn out. Changing places or projects requires destroying and
rebuilding teams of employees, sacrificing the often-significant value of
experienced people who know how to work with each other. A firm must be
firmly solid; the whole point of a financial market is that it is liquid.
Fiduciary duty and loyalties lead to the same result. Corporate
managers are expected to work for the firm. Shareholder managers are not.
It is perfectly acceptable—legally and ideologically–for a shareholder to
explicitly harm the long-term interests of the firm for the short-term
interests of the shareholder (at least if there are no minority shareholders
injured in the process). Thus, it is not surprising that hedge fund and private
equity managers, who operate as super-CEOs supervising the CEOs of the
operating companies their funds own, yet legally are representatives of a
shareholder rather than operating company fiduciaries, pay themselves far
more than the operating executives.73 Private equity fund manager Steven
Schwartzman received almost $800 million in 2015. 74 Top hedge fund
managers have received pay of over a billion dollars in a single year.75 Even
the Disney court might have been troubled had these been corporate
fiduciaries. 76
The upshot is that portfolio investors—shareholders and bondholders—
inhabit a fundamentally different world than any firm manager. Portfolio
investors need not concern themselves overmuch with particular projects,
73. See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Looting: The Puzzle of Private Equity, 3 BROOK. J.
CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2008) [hereinafter Greenwood, Puzzle of Private Equity].
74. See Benn Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private Equity Earners
Make?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/dealbook
/just-how-much-do-the-top-private-equity-earners-make.html (noting that most of this pay was in
the form of “carried interest” or earnings on his own investments in the firm’s funds, rather than
salary).
75. See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest–Earning Hedge Fund Managers and Traders,
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2018, 9:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2018/04/17/the-25highest-earning-hedge-fund-managers-and-traders-3/#75d5b2e53596.
76. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 779 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(upholding Disney’s payment of $140 million to its failed CEO). The statement in the text is
probably incorrect, however, if the executives receive their payouts in their shareholder role, as
many founders and long-term executives do. I am aware of no case holding that an otherwise legal
payout to shareholders—that is, out of surplus or profit, see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170 (2010),
and without making the corporation insolvent, see Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.40(c) (1969) (AM.
BAR ASS’N, amended 1973)—is a potential violation of a board’s fiduciary duty just because a
large part of the payout goes to a shareholder with an executive or controlling role in the firm.
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technologies, places, teams or even political systems, because they can
diversify by separating their investments into many little bits in many
projects and places. They can transform long term investments into short
term ones and vice versa. Any single investment has only a limited impact
on the portfolio as whole. This is not the world of operating companies.
Each time that Boeing designs a new generation of planes, or Intel a new
generation of processors, it places the company’s future existence at risk.
Financial investors always have the option of eliminating most of that risk
by diversification—buying small amounts of multiple securities instead of
placing all their eggs into one basket. The concerns of financial market
investors, thus, are radically different from those of operating companies.
Similarly, operating companies must worry about competition. Most
publicly traded corporations operate in oligopolistic consumer and producer
markets, where prices can be set well above marginal and even average
cost. Nonetheless, sales and profits may easily be lost to competitors.
Similarly, advertising to seize market share from competitors is a major part
of the business strategy of most oligopolistic businesses.
In contrast, portfolio investors have a radically different interest: so
long as all the major operating players are publicly traded, they can hold
shares in all of them. Thus, they should be entirely indifferent when one
firm wins market share from another; the increased market share of the
winning firm will be balanced out in the financial portfolio by the losses of
the loser. However, portfolio investors cannot own shares in human
consumers or employees. Therefore, they have a strong interest in avoiding
inter-company competition that might reduce prices or increase wages, even
if an individual company in which they hold shares suffers as a result.
Shareholder oriented managers, or managers of diversified institutional
shareholders, have a strong interest in suppressing competition and far less
interest in any particular firm’s success.
In short, portfolio investors and corporate managers should have
different risk tolerance, different time frames, different commitments to
specific projects, and different views of the benefits and dangers of
competition. Any manager trying to manage on behalf of stock market
investors faces an intractable conflict between the interests of the institution
and its shareholders.
H. CONFLICTING GOALS NEAR INSOLVENCY
Of course, the conflict gets far worse near insolvency. Shareholders
have unlimited financial upside but limited downside, since their expected
dividends and stock price can go up as high as the firm’s profits but cannot
ever go below zero whatever the firm’s losses. Once the firm’s equity value
reaches zero, further firm losses must be borne by other firm participants
such as lenders, employees or other creditors. Thus, shareholders may be
able to profit from gambles that clearly have negative expected returns,
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especially if they can invest in multiple firms making similar gambles. The
winners will more than compensate for the limited losses they suffer from
the losers. For this reason, Delaware extends additional protections to
creditors in insolvency, allowing them to bring derivative actions
demanding the firm be operated in their ultimate interest. 77
But this is only an extreme version of the universal reality that
diversified shareholders profit when companies, in the aggregate, take
excessive risk. Corporate law always protects shareholders from the full
downside of corporate bets, which will be borne by others. Increasing
competitive efficiency is difficult, but it only takes position or power to
shift uncompensated risk to other corporate participants. Accordingly,
diversified shareholders with serious control over companies likely will
operate them in a riskier manner than other participants, both because
shareholders bear less of the risk of failure than other participants and
because shareholders may be able to profit from potential firms’ losses via
their other investments.
Finally, we make an intrinsically difficult task still more difficult by
confusing ourselves. Shareholders are often thought of as “owners” of the
corporation. But owners don’t need outside help to seize the proceeds of
their property; they just take their rents. Shareholder profit maximization
theory demands that managers pay shareholders corporate funds (as
dividends or otherwise) which shareholders have no legal right or power to
take for themselves. 78 Similarly, the shareholder-centered view contends
that firms “ought” to turn profits over to shareholders, but ordinary
corporate finance teaches that equity sales are simply a source of funding,
largely fungible with borrowing or retained earnings. On this view,
managers learn to treat shares as input that, like any input, ought to be costminimized in the pursuit of efficiency and profit. Rather than owners,
shares are simply another exploitable resource for the firm’s profit.
To add to the confusion, it is common to claim that shares are the
residual risk bearers in a corporation—and that this justifies giving them
voting authority because it means that they have interests aligned with the
firms. This is wrong on two levels. First, shares manifestly are not the
residual risk bearers outside of liquidation. Firms routinely cut employment
long before they cut dividends. If the function of shareholders in the firm is

77. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)
(rejecting ‘zone of insolvency’ analysis; even when a corporation is close to insolvency, directors’
duty is to “exercise[e] their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for its
shareholders,” but allowing creditors to assert derivative claim for breach of directors’ fiduciary
duty to corporation when corporation is insolvent); cf. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v.
Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991) (explaining “curious” incentives near insolvency).
78. Only directors, not shareholders, may declare a dividend. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170
(2010).
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to absorb and eliminate firm specific risk, in practice they are not
performing.
Second, even to the extent that shareholders do bear firm risk, that
would simply mean that they are insurers. Like other insurers, financial
investors can more easily diversify than other firm participants, and thus
can eliminate certain forms of firm specific risk. 79 Insurance is a worthy and
useful service. But in no other context would we expect insurers to control
the insured or assume that their interests are aligned with the insured’s. On
the contrary; insurers are highly regulated precisely because they are always
in conflict with their insureds and have strong incentives to not provide the
risk-bearing services which they contractually assumed. This is obviously
true of the stock market as well. Portfolios are diversified, timeless, skillless and placeless—precisely the opposite of all other firm participants, and
extraordinarily poor proxies for the public good. Hedging and empty voting
are merely the most visible manifestations of the fundamental disconnect
between the interests of equity investors and the rest of us in firm success. 80
I. CORPORATE LAW SUMMARIZED
In summary, we can characterize publicly traded corporations outside
of bankruptcy as quasi-autonomous self-governing units. While the general
view in the business schools and business press is that business corporations
are formed and operated for the purpose of shareholder profit, the law does
not require this goal. Instead, most corporation statutes explicitly state that a
business corporation “has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business” 81
and explicitly permit the corporation’s board to use its funds to support a
variety of activities with no obvious connection to shareholder profit,
including to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes.” 82 Similarly, while the courts routinely
exhort the profit-maximization goal, they have also left enforcing and even

79. For these purposes, bondholders, shareholders and large or syndicated bank lenders seem
interchangeable—all are diversified finance sources.
80. See generally Henry Hu & Bernard Black, supra note 9 (describing mechanisms by which
stock market players can control corporate votes without the associated economic risk of
shareholding). Note that empty voting—votes without economic exposure—is simply the reductio
of ordinary diversified shareholding. The point of diversification is to reduce the shareholder’s
exposure to firm specific risk, which is another way of saying that the shareholder’s interest and
the firm’s will never be aligned. See Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 9, at 1071.
81. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.01(a) (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973) (“Every
corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business”); cf.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2010) (“A corporation may be incorporated or organized under
this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes”).
82. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2010); cf. Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 3.01(a)(13), (a)(14)
(1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 1973) (“to make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific or educational purposes; to transact any lawful business that will aid
governmental policy”).
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defining it entirely to the discretion of the board in all but the most
extraordinary circumstances. 83
Historically, corporate status was regarded as a special privilege
granted only for special, public, purposes. 84 This notion has long since
disappeared from the statutes. However, widespread alternative views track
the historical rationale: corporations ought to be operated to produce useful
products and services at a fair price (the “consumer” view) or to provide
good jobs (the “producer” view).
Under both the older special privilege view and the modern consumer
and producer views, a democratically answerable legal system presumably
grants corporations the privileges of autonomy and legal personality in the
expectation that they will serve the public good. Properly guided market
incentives can lead to prosperity and other social goods. On the other hand,
untethered pursuit of profit is not necessarily in the public interest. In
particular, firms often find it narrowly profitable to violate regulatory rules
meant to ensure that businesses internalize their costs, do not impose
pollution or safety hazards on others, and treat employees and customers
honestly. Indeed, with the increasing importance of lobbying and the rise of
corporate-funded electioneering, businesses often perceive profit in seeking
to eliminate those laws, even where the long term consequences may be
devastating to the industry or the country generally. 85 Thus, the American
automobile industry has long and influentially opposed health insurance
reform despite the extraordinarily competitive burden employer-funded
insurance places on companies with older or retired workforces in an
international market where foreign production does not incur such costs.
Similarly, parts of the fossil fuel industry have actively sought taxpayer
subsidies of fossil fuels and to slow the adoption of alternatives 86—despite
the potentially disastrous consequences of global climate change, including
the fallout from the collapse of peasant farming in the Mid-East and
elsewhere. Similarly, the stock market generally appears favorably
impressed by reductions in taxes on the profits or upper-class incomes, even
if the consequence is degradation of public services and infrastructure

83. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), discussed
supra pp. 11–13; Gabelli & Co., Inc. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479 A.2d 276 (Del. 1984), discussed
supra note 61; In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 779 (Del. Ch.
2005).
84. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860
(HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 1977).
85. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (upholding
corporate campaign contributions).
86. See, e.g., Ian Johnston, Exxon Mobil: Oil and gas giant ‘misled’ the public about climate
change, say Harvard experts, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 23, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/environment/exxonmobil-climate-change-oil-gas-fossil-fuels-global-warmingharvard-a7908541.html.
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necessary for a successful economy or the impoverishment of the customers
whose demand keeps a capitalist economy thriving.
Current law leaves the choice of corporate goals, like the choice of the
means to those goals, to the almost unfettered discretion of incumbent
directors and managers. The only effective judicial limit is the fiduciary rule
that managers and directors may not treat corporate property as their own.
Even that rule, however, is quite limited, as shown by judicial willingness
to uphold virtually any compensation agreement so long as directors are
willing to state that insider pay is for the benefit of the firm. 87
Institutionally, managers are appointed by and serve at the will of
directors, and directors are usually elected by shareholders on the
plutocratic basis of one share one vote. Since shares, and therefore votes,
are freely bought and sold, this means that, ultimately, the corporation’s
managers answer to the stock market. In practice, managers, formally or
informally, control the nomination process for director candidates and stock
market investors are more likely to sell shares than vote against incumbents.
Therefore, corporate elections tend to be overwhelmingly in support of the
incumbents; barring crisis, usually managers have effective control of their
own supervisors.
Even when shareholders do assert their control powers—usually by
selling their shares to an investor that buys a control bloc of votes—the
result is simply to shift power from internal corporate managers to external
financial market managers. The system remains one of managers
supervising managers, with strong incentives to follow the fads and
interests of the financial markets.
The only effective limit on managerial discretion, then, is markets. The
stock market may drive the stock price down or up. Of course, stock price
movements have no direct impact on the firm outside the unusual
circumstance that the firm wishes to sell new stock. 88 Managers holding
stock or options, or simply ideologically committed to shareholder primacy,
may take these stock price movements as critical information influencing
their decisions; while such behavior clearly meets traditional
understandings of corruption, lack of professionalism and even breach of
87. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 779 (Del. Ch. 2005).
88. Price movement in the secondary market reflect stock investors selling to each other; the

firm is not involved in these transactions and receives no benefit when the stock price goes up or
loss when the price goes down. Ordinarily, then, the company should be able to continue business
as usual regardless of what happens in the stock market. There is one important exception. If the
company is highly dependent on continual market confidence, for example if it is using short term
borrowing to finance illiquid investments, a drop in stock price may signal to other market
players, such as lenders, the possibility of a run. In this case, the stock price drop can do serious
damage to the company. Matt Taibbi has argued that such a loss of lender confidence precipitated
by a stock price drop in highly leveraged companies led to the demise of both Bear Stearns and
Lehman. See Matt Taibbi, Wall Street’s Naked Swindle, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 2010, 8:09 PM
ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/wall-streets-naked-swindle-194908/.
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the duty of loyalty, modern courts and public opinion appear to see it as
entirely appropriate.
Other markets in which the firm participates (supplier, labor, consumer)
will affect the firm more directly. If firm managers are unable to obtain the
resources the firm needs at a price lower than it can sell its goods or
services, then it will run an economic loss and, ultimately, become
insolvent.
II. THE IRRELEVANCE OF CORPORATE LAW’S GOALS
Can we then say something about the goals of ordinary corporate law
that ought to determine the rules in insolvency? I do not believe that we can
say much.
To be sure, in a democratic republic all legitimate law ultimately ought
to serve the public, but the very grant of autonomy to corporate managers
means that our legislatures have, rightly or wrongly, concluded that we are
better off letting managers decide the details.
Crude popularizers of Adam Smith’s invisible hand imply, not very
convincingly, that financial, consumer, and labor markets as well as the
managers’ own financial interests will lead managers to act in the public
interest. 89 Alternatively, they contend that managers should not be guided
by their own self-interest, which as Smith himself pointed out, will often
lead them to sloth or profit at the expense of the institutions they operate, 90
but should pursue profit for the firm or its anonymous, ever-changing
investors—even if that means setting side their own political values, senses
of right and wrong, loyalty to co-workers or customers, or even
commitment to the firm itself. More sophisticated students of mixed
economies may conclude that direct attempts to control corporate decision
making are likely to succumb to information overload, bureaucratic
ossification, or the temptations of corruption. Adjusting market rules so that
89. Adam Smith himself argued that businessmen were likely to work against the public
interest if they could. SMITH, supra note 45, at Book I, ch. X (“People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”).
90. SMITH, supra note 45, at Book V, ch. I (“The directors of such companies, however, being
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own”). Edmund Burke, prosecuting the impeachment of
Warren Hastings as Governor General of the East Asia Company, famously denounced as
corruption the fact that company officials became rich as the East Asia Company languished and
its Indian subjects starved. See, e.g., Julie Murray, Company Rules: Burke, Hastings, and the
Specter of the Modern Liberal State, 41 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 1, 55, 59–61, 63 (2007),
available at www.jstor.org/stable/30053748 (describing Burke’s critique of the “corruption of
Hastings’s public self by his ungovernable private passions and interests” as part of his larger
attack on the feudal aspects of corporate charters, the “despotism . . . invariably attend[ing] the
drive to private wealth,” and the subordination of individuals to the company’s leaders and its
collective “esprit de corps”).
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market incentives press disparate and competing decisionmakers in socially
useful directions may be more likely to succeed, especially when we
disagree about the best route to progress. Others contend that the power of
corporations is so great and the profit incentive so often ill-directed that
managers ought consciously to use their discretion in ways that are not
obviously sociopathic—to avoid, for example, promoting cancer or global
warming even if the company’s narrow profit motive counsels the opposite.
Corporate law in the modern era is, as we have seen, largely agnostic on
this debate. Corporations are largely free to seek their own path within the
limits of extant regulatory law and their ability to lobby for its change. 91
Indeed, as discussed above, the law is quite clear that corporations may
allocate any surplus they generate in almost any way that the firm’s
decision makers determine, responding to the political and market power of
the various firm constituencies and their own consciences. 92 If competition
requires or a firm facing less-than-perfect competition chooses, it may give
the surplus to consumers in the form of lower prices. But, if the firm is able
to overcome the pressures of consumer market competition, it may also
give its surplus to employees as higher wages, to suppliers as higher prices,
to landlords as rents, to bondholders as interest, or to the people as taxes. If
none of those participants have sufficient market power to demand the
surplus, managers and directors are authorized, but never required, to
distribute it as dividends to shareholders. In each case, outside observers
rarely will be able to tell whether the payment was a compelled response to
market forces, poor bargaining over a surplus to cooperation (i.e., economic
rents) or a purely voluntary gift. 93
Managers need not elect to organize as a business corporation and need
not have publicly traded shares if they do so elect. But so long as they retain
the publicly traded form, shares are entitled to vote for the corporation’s
board of directors, and those shares, with their votes, are freely bought and
sold.
91. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects management’s ability to
use corporate resources to lobby for changes in regulatory law, whether they would free the
company to follow the logic of sociopathic profit seeking or free managers from it. See Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (overturning, on free speech grounds,
limitations on corporate managers’ spending other people’s money to influence political debate
and elections); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Person, State or Not: The Place of Business Corporations
in Our Constitutional Order, 87 COL. L. REV. 351, 404–06 (2016) (arguing that this modern form
of Lochnerism is as problematic as the original); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why
Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1050 n. 144 (1998) (corporate fiduciaries
will not made the political tradeoffs between competing goals that citizens must).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2010) (corporation to be managed by its directors).
93. Ordinarily, sunk costs, such as the payments initial shareholders make in an IPO, earn no
returns in a competitive market, so dividends usually should be understood as voluntary gifts
rather than payments for services received. Standard accounting agrees. It considers dividends
distributions of profit rather than payments to factors of production. The gift understanding,
however, conflicts with claims that shareholders have a right to demand payment or that
corporations should take shareholder profits as their primary goal.
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In modern financial markets, portfolio investors can acquire those votes
without any deep commitment to the firm. Indeed, in most cases they must
do so: while corporate managers have nearly unreviewable discretion, many
portfolio managers would be in violation of law if they failed to diversify
the portfolios they manage. 94 By buying shares of multiple firms, the
portfolio replaces the risk of particular managerial failures or successes with
average risk, much as insurance replaces the financial risk of particular
accidents with the cost of the average accident.
A fully diversified portfolio has as its primary interest ensuring that
returns go to publicly traded companies and not to non-traded employees or
individual consumers; it cares little about which firm extracts surplus from
the non-traded citizens. In this sense, a diversified shareholder’s interests
are almost precisely opposite those of the citizenry, even if it itself is not
managed on behalf of, for example, a foreign royal family or the as yet
unborn citizens of a foreign state. 95 In short, we have no particular reason to
think that diversified institutional investors will act in the interest of any
particular firm they hold stock in, let alone the American public.
What we are left with, then, is this: corporate law structures a struggle
over corporate surplus. Absent unions, the struggle is tilted against
employees from the beginning, since financial capital is inherently more
mobile and more able to refuse services if not paid what it demands. It
again tilts the field by giving shareholders, but not employees, votes for the
board of directors, making it easier for investors to demand that directors,
and through them managers, serve their interests. The dominant ideology of
the last generation has tilted the field still more, by teaching managers that
they ought to bargain as the united representative of all investors against
individual employees (rather than as the representative of labor hiring
capital as needed, or as a neutral technocratic elite managing on behalf of an
amorphous common interest). 96 Similarly, the near demise of anti-trust law
has tilted the field towards capital and against consumers as increasingly

94. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C § 1104(a)(C) (2012) (ERISA trustee’s fiduciary duty to diversify).
Most mutual fund managers are under a similar contractual duty.
95. See, e.g., About PIF, PUB. INV. FUND, https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/AboutPIF.aspx
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (describing Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, one of the bestknown sovereign wealth funds). The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global holds 1.4% of
listed securities worldwide, including almost $250 billion in US equities. Holdings as at
31.12.2017, NORGES BANK INV. MANAGEMENT (last visited Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nbim.
no/en/the-fund/holdings/holdings-as-at-31.12.2017/.
96. Compare Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 248, 327 (1999) (arguing that managers ought to view themselves as mediators
between different claimants), with HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 239
(1996) (claiming that the apparently greater efficiency of business corporations is due to their
having a single, measurable, goal of profit instead of a more amorphous public interest).
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large companies have increasing oligopolistic power and are less
constrained by competitive consumer, employee or supplier markets.97
Nonetheless, while the law and ideology strengthen some corporate
participants and weaken others, it does not impose any particular priority on
claimants. If employees have particular market power or bureaucratic
influence, they may seize the bulk of the corporation’s surplus in the form
of high pay (as in the investment banks or some technology companies) or
high rates of employment (as was the case for some “featherbedded”
companies in the past). For example, Bear Stearns’ bankers took large
paychecks from the firm even as its stock price plunged; 98 Google’s parent
company, Alphabet, pays no dividends, suggesting that the profits from its
extraordinary market dominance are flowing elsewhere, at least in part to its
highly paid engineers and upper-level executives and their favorite
projects. 99 If consumers have sufficient power or the anti-trust authorities
do their job, the corporate surplus may be entirely devoted to price
reductions, leaving the firm with minimal accounting profits and
shareholders with little or no returns. Historically, the airline industry has
made no profits; Amazon has given much of its surplus to consumers in the
form of lower prices and below-cost shipping and used much of the rest to
expand its business, in effect passing its surplus out to additional
employees, including both poorly-paid warehouse fulfillment workers and
others more generously compensated. 100

97. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978) (arguing that anti-trust law should
abandon its historic focus on restricting the size and political influence of powerful corporations
and instead focus merely on predicted effects on consumer prices). Bork’s theory, influential in
both the courts and the administrative agencies, combined with economic models that focus on
short-term effects in the consumer markets, ignore labor markets, and assume away long-term
burdens on innovation, growth and competition, led to a dramatic drop in anti-trust enforcement in
the long Reagan era.
98. Bear Stearns executives received more in pay during the 2004–06 period than the final sale
price of the company in 2008. Joann S. Lublin, Credit Crisis: The Response: For Top Bear
Executives, ‘Paltry’ Exit Packages, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2008).
99. See, e.g., Jared Cummans, Why Google Doesn’t Pay a Dividend, DIVIDEND.COM (Sept. 29,
2014),
http://www.dividend.com/how-to-invest/why-google-goog-doesnt-pay-a-dividend/
(reporting that Google’s parent company spends large sums on R&D and purchases of other
companies).
100. See, e.g., Jon Markman, The Amazon Era: No Profits, No Problem, FORBES (May 23,
2017, 9:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2017/05/23/the-amazon-era-noprofits-no-problem/#13789f8f437a (reporting that Amazon and several other companies have been
very attractive to the stock market while rarely reporting accounting profits); Adam LevinWeinberg, Is Amazon.com’s Retail Business Actually Profitable? (It’s Complicated), THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 14, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/04/14/is-amazoncom-retail-business-actually-profitable.aspx (reporting that Amazon had accounting profits of $3
billion in 2017, but it also vested stock grants to employees worth $10 billion, only $4.2 billion of
which was recorded as a compensation expense).
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III. IMPLICATIONS IN INSOLVENCY
Bankruptcy, as the papers in this Symposium make clear, both
continues the fundamental conflict and adds new manifestations. In
insolvency, creditors—and the markets—have more “voice” than
shareholders and markets do in a more routine situation. This makes the
problems with shareholder voting—of both the free riding and the conflicts
of interest types—more immediate; votes are less likely to be pro-forma
ratification of the workings of the established powers-that-be than when the
establishment has not already demonstrated its incompetence.
A. THE WRONG VALUES
Janger and Levitin base their call for reform on two values they find in
bankruptcy law: retaining control in the residual claimant and equality of
claimants. 101 As an outsider to bankruptcy law, I would have assumed the
ultimate goal of bankruptcy to be keeping the American job machine
running smoothly. The two values that Janger and Levitin identify seem to
be distinctly secondary—and not even necessarily present.
As to the first value, the claim that the residual claimant ought to
control the enterprise needs to be carefully theorized. It should be taken not
as a first principle but as a crude rule of thumb likely to mislead in many
circumstances.
Outside of bankruptcy, corporations function perfectly well without any
residual claimant: managers have nearly complete discretion to give
surpluses to or impose losses on nearly any corporate participant. There is
no rule that any particular claimant be paid before others. It is perfectly
permissible, for instance, to take on junior debt that reduces the likelihood
that senior debt will be paid in full.102 Similarly, a firm may pay a dividend
knowing that it will be unable to pay future bond obligations unless it
massively reduces its payroll or has reasonably good luck in the consumer
market; the only restriction is that managers plausibly expect to be able to
impose the costs on those other claimants and the dividend payment does
not actually make the firm insolvent.103
It is sometimes said that shareholders are the residual claimant in a
solvent firm because all other claims are defined by contract,104 but this is
an illusion at best. 105 Contracts are always open for renegotiation, even
101. Janger & Levitin, supra note 3, at 43–44.
102. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
103. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (2010) (barring dividends that would make corporation

insolvent); see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99–101
(Del. 2007) (emphasizing autonomy of board even close to insolvency).
104. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991).
105. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants 24–31 (Stan. L. Sch.
John M. Olin. Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 217, 2001),
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when they appear to be long term. 106 This may be more or less explicit.
Employees nearly all serve at will, meaning that the firm’s managers can
fire them, hire more, or change salaries at any time. Loans are typically
written in rigid language, but usually lenders and borrowers seek to manage
debt so it is regularly rolled over (short-term paper), callable and prepayable at regular intervals, or laddered so that at any given time some is
open to renegotiation. Long term supply and purchase contracts are
routinely renegotiated as conditions change even when they have apparently
fixed terms. In the real world, firms routinely attempt to impose unexpected
losses on employees, suppliers and customers long before they reduce
shareholder dividends, and the same is true of unexpected gains. Indeed,
even the most casual empiricism suggests that employees are far more
likely to be the residual claimant than shareholders. Dividends are far more
stable than profits or payroll.
More importantly, the heavy legal thumb on the scale to favor
shareholders in the competition for corporate surplus has proven a mistake.
Since the 1980s, the share of economic wealth going to investors and top
managers has soared, leaving ordinary Americans with little or no benefit
from a half century of economic growth. Average salaries for men with
average education, for example, are unchanged after inflation, while for
men with only a high school education they have actually dropped. Women
have vastly increased the number of hours they work for pay (without a
commensurate decrease in unpaid work in caretaking and home
maintenance), but the net result for American households in the middle
80% has been only to maintain, not increase, their real financial income.
Meanwhile, this troubling and unjust increase in inequality is associated
with a parallel slowdown in economic growth. While not all economists
agree, it seems probable that with middle class income stagnant for close to
a generation and an increasing share taken up by price increases in housing,
healthcare and (for the fortunate) higher education, we have less of the
middle-class consumer consumption that once drove the American
economy’s growth. 107
Rawls 108 contended that inequality could be justified if it made the
worst off materially better off, ignoring Veblen’s point that at some
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1528437 (noting that many corporate
participants are residual claimants); MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 202–34 (1995)
(describing employees as residual claimants).
106. Cf. HANSMANN, supra note 96, at 27 (pointing out the risks of long term contracting and
opportunistic behavior).
107. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY (HARVEST/HBJ 1964) (arguing that recessions are generally caused by a
failure of demand); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)
(documenting rise of inequality and concentration of wealth).
108. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65–68 (1971) (describing “difference principle”).
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relatively low level of income, absolute material wealth is less important
that relative wealth. 109 But Rawls’ implicit economics—his assumption,
similar to trickle-down Reaganomics, that increased inequality leads to
increased economic growth making even the worst off financially wealthier
eventually proved wrong. 110 We traded off the absolute well-being of 80 or
90% of our compatriots in order to make a few far richer.
At this point, it should be clear that corporate law ought to be pushing
in the opposite direction, not to help investors and top managers seize the
corporate surplus but to force them to share it with employees and other
corporate participants. If there ever was a principled argument for corporate
law that assists the wealthy in upward redistribution of wealth and income,
it no longer applies. As this Article illustrates, shareholders lack any moral,
legal or economic claim to the surplus that corporations create; in
competitive markets it ought to go, instead, to those who create it or
consumers. More generally, the upward redistribution of wealth and income
of the last several decades has failed to encourage economic growth or
democracy. We need, instead, to find new ways to strengthen the internal
corporate bargaining and market power of employees, consumers and other
ordinary non-financial corporate participants. Current market rules make it
too easy for managerial incumbents in alliance with financial markets to
seize a disproportionate share of the corporate surplus; we need to revise
those rules to allow a fairer competition.
In bankruptcy, unlike during the ordinary course, the law does impose
formal priority rules (although in practice negotiated resolutions are
possible only by varying them). But those rules should not be treated as
absolute values rather than legal formalities. Outside of bankruptcy, we
expect corporate claimants to continually struggle over allocation of
corporate surplus and, as we have seen, the arguments for the law assisting
shareholders are weak, at best. In insolvency, the arguments for assuring the

109. See generally THORNSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 24 (B. W.
Huebsch, 1912) (“The possession of wealth conveys honor; it is an invidious distinction.”).
110. Rawls’ difference principle holds that inequality is justified to the extent that it makes the
worst off better off. RAWLS, supra note 106, at 65–68. Rawls assumes that extreme equality
would lower the economic well-being of the worst off, by destroying incentives (much as the
Laffer Curve contends that extremely high taxation would stifle economic activity and therefore
tax receipts). But that tradeoff is not our reality. Today, it seems far more likely that increased
equality would increase both the absolute wealth of the worst off and economic growth for all, by
shifting demand to the middle and lower middle class (who consume basically all their income),
from the uber-rich, who are more likely to pursue power or honor with smaller multiplier effects.
Veblen argues that beyond subsistence, people pursue wealth because it is a marker of honor.
VEBLEN, supra note 109, at 74. Honor is inherently a zero-sum game: I can only have more if you
have less. Thus, even leaving aside demand-driven economic growth, to the extent that Veblen is
right to understand wealth as the pursuit of relative status rather than the accumulation of
possessions for their own sake, Rawls’ difference principle demands—contrary to Rawls’ own
interpretation—fairly extreme equality. Increased inequality in relative status always makes the
worst off worse off, not better off.
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victory of incumbent management and finance over other corporate
participants are weaker still.
In particular, there is no a priori reason to believe that the legally
defined junior financial claimant is more aligned with the needs of the
economy, or the firm, than the groups Janger and Levitin identify as
“excessively long”—employees and contracting parties that may prefer the
firm’s existence to maximization of current value. To be sure, maximization
of current value will often be completely contrary to longer term interests or
continued corporate existence. But the social interest is more likely to be
aligned with the long-term interests than the short-term interests.
In other words, the judgment that other groups are “excessively” long
seems wrong. On the contrary, in most cases, survival of the institution is
exactly what bankruptcy should be aiming for. Institutions are difficult to
create and costly to dismantle. If they can be reformed to be viable, even
with considerable loss of financial value, that is likely to be better for
participants and the economy as a whole than liquidation.111 To make the
same point in more conventional economic terms: the residual claimants,
those whose interests are most aligned with the institution and society, are
highly likely to be exactly those that Janger and Levitin label “excessively
long.” They are the least likely to be diversified and the most likely to be
dependent on the specific characteristics of the firm: employees with firm
specific skills, in particular, are at risk of losing the entire value of their
investment if the firm fails, with no opportunity to reduce their losses
through diversification. They are the ones with the most to lose and,
perversely, the ones to whom bankruptcy law gives the least bargaining
power. Their lack of diversification and peculiar connection to the firm also
means that they have the most to gain from successful reorganization, at
least if the reorganization does not exclude them. Financial investors,
whether holding equity or debt, normally diversify in order to limit
downside risks, but this necessarily means that they also limit their upside.
The undiversified employees, as well as customers or suppliers with no
ready alternative business partners, are far more exposed to the particular
firm.
As to the second value Janger and Levitin identify, equality of
claimants, 112 it is questionable whether such a value even exists in ordinary
corporate law. Before Moran, one could have argued that the poison pill
violated the most basic principle of corporate law, that shares of the same
series have the same entitlement to corporate returns. 113 The poison pill
111. This reasoning does not apply to sufficiently small-scale businesses. If no institution is at
stake, it may well be best to speed “creative destruction” along by encouraging dissolution.
112. Janger & Levitin, supra note 3.
113. See, e.g., Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (overturning poison pill on ground that special preferred stock failed to preserve
uniform voting rights for entire series of shares).
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clearly discriminated. Yet it was upheld almost without dissent. 114
Similarly, all markets insist on one price, but also violate the principle as
often as they uphold it.
Equality is always a value. However, the equality that has a prima facie
claim to validity is equality of persons, not equality of dollars or claims. If
equality of dollar claims leads to further empowering large institutional
creditors relative to individual employees, it is the wrong kind of equality.
Instead, we should be looking for solutions that make it more likely that
useful institutions will survive and less likely that investors will be willing
to finance, whether by equity or debt, and participate in raids that create
investor profit by using up the company’s accumulated reputation and good
will, by defaulting on implicit contracts with consumers, suppliers or
employees, by restructuring to reduce taxes or obligations relating to past
operations such as pensions or polluted manufacturing sites, or simply by
squeezing corporate participants. Equality of claims does not, at least on its
face, promote this goal.
B. TOWARD BETTER VALUES
Stepping back to consider the broader goals of corporate law suggests a
different direction for future work. Corporate law is a form of constitutional
law, setting out the officers who will govern the firm, the extent and limits
of their authority, the degree to which they are answerable to other firm
participants, courts and the financial markets, and the limits—or, lack of
limits—on their powers.
Notably, corporate constitutional law lacks any conceptions of due
process, individual rights, or separation of powers within the firm.
Employees lack even the first right of citizens, the right to have their good
taken as the good of the whole. Corporate law treats them not as citizens but
subjects: while directors are urged to act in the interests of the firm, those
interests ordinarily do not include the preferences, goals, interests or values
of the people who make up the firm.
The doctrine of employment at will is parallel, in the political sphere, to
a regime’s right to summarily exile dissidents and the disaffected; generally
considered to be a clear mark of tyranny. Without a right to continued
membership in the firm, employees are entirely dependent on the good will
of their superiors. Even if the firm follows bureaucratic process, there can
be no dissent, no loyal opposition, and, indeed, nothing resembling the legal
rights protected by due process that citizens depend upon for personal
freedom.
Similarly, corporate governance as we know it seems doomed to
replicate the failures of the court-centered aristocracies that we fought to
114. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding poison

pill).
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eliminate in the political sphere. Even the best of decisionmakers make
mistakes (and hierarchal systems rarely promote the best). Multiple points
of view reduce the likelihood of major error. Yet, corporate governance
lacks the basic structure necessary to produce a public opinion that might
check or guide the absolute power at the top of their hierarchy. Employees
serve at the will of their superiors; critics of the boss keep their critiques to
themselves or get fired.
Boards of directors are the nominal bosses of the CEO, yet there too,
“team players” are prized above all. Open disagreement means, inevitably,
that either the critic or the CEO will resign; there is no room for a loyal
opposition. Without independent access to information in the firm or a
countervailing bureaucratic power, boards are generally poorly positioned
to act except in crisis, and when they do act, as a practical matter they can
do little other than replace the CEO—and even in hiring chief executives,
they predictably and routinely fail. Decision makers trained to be yes-men,
surrounded by other yes-men, are deprived of the debate and criticism
necessary for sound decisions.
Insolvency is a sign that conventional corporate law has failed even
within its own limited terms. Accordingly, it is an appropriate moment to
pull back and consider broad reforms which we might hesitate, for good
Burkean reasons, 115 to impose on more successful institutions.
As a start, we might begin by treating corporate governance as
governance. Governors ought to govern in the interests of all those they
govern, not just a subset defined by wealth. Similarly, the corporate good
and the corporate interest should mean something more than merely
promoting the financial interests of investors that have failed in their jobs of
monitoring or allocating capital. Rather than defining the corporate interest
as “paying the senior creditors the most possible,” we ought to redefine a
genuine public interest—seeking to assure that the reorganized firm is
managed, during and after insolvency, to maximize the good of the
maximum number of affected individuals. That means, at a minimum,
seeking to preserve jobs and useful goods and services wherever possible,
even at the cost of requiring financial investors to accept the losses for
which they were paid interest or dividends.
Preserving the institution, to the extent that it can satisfy consumer
desires and provide decent jobs, ought always to be a goal of
reorganization. But there is no reason to protect failed incumbent leaders or
investors that have failed in their assigned role of assuring that corporations
serve the public interest.

115. See generally BURKE, supra note 55 (urging caution in “cashiering” even moderately
successful governors).
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Ordinary corporate law has not escaped its feudal origins. 116 The crisis
of insolvency is a clear mark of the failure of the corporate law feudal
model of officeholders answerable only to accumulated wealth (and largely
independent even of that), and governing without the constraints of due
process, individual rights, or countervailing institutions. Accordingly,
insolvency law should reject the ordinary corporate norms, not attempt to
continue in their failed path.
In large corporate bankruptcies, the normal course ought to include: (1)
replacing incumbent management; (2) giving strong preference in
reorganization to the interests of undiversified participants, especially
employees and pensioners, over those of investors and creditors that could
have protected themselves by diversification; (3) granting additional voting
rights to additional parties, especially employees; (4) creating
countervailing institutions such as a voting public representative to speak,
like the Lorax, 117 for affected outsiders; (5) creating fora for internal debate
and protection for critics of incumbent management; and (6) in liquidation,
giving employees some form of priority over debt creditors in liquidation,
including future expectations, such as a preferred claim for an additional
year of pay.
While detailed proposals are beyond the scope of this Article, the
principles that should guide reform are clear. First, genuine financial
distress is a strong indicator that incumbents have failed to manage the
company appropriately. In the ordinary course, reorganization will mean
that shareholders and debtholders are going to have to accept write-downs
on their claims. Often, employees will lose their jobs or be forced to accept
reductions in pay or benefits, even if guaranteed by contract or collective
bargaining agreement. Since managers and directors are fiduciaries for the
firm, they should not be permitted to profit from injuries to the firm
participants. Even leaving aside issues of competence, if others are going to
have to take losses, those in charge should be near the head of the line.
Reversing the presumption of deference to incumbent managers is
especially important because of the phenomenon of strategic filings.
Sometimes managers cause firms to enter bankruptcy not because of
pressing financial distress but to avoid contractual and other obligations that
they no longer perceive as in the firm’s interest. For example, a firm may
have had a generous pension plan in an era when large, stable employment
was a priority. Later, automation or outsourcing may make employee
turnover less of an issue. Pensions for retired employees are a current cost
with no current benefit (pensioners have no way of reclaiming work they
did), so a firm that does not mind developing a reputation for reneging on
116. See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Neofeudalism: The Surprising Foundations of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 163 (2017).
117. DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971) (“I speak for the trees, for the trees have no tongues.”).
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deals, may find it attractive to attempt to avoid pension obligations.
Bankruptcy may allow the firm to reject these obligations or to avoid
collective bargaining agreements, and then to redistribute the savings to
other firm participants. Bankruptcy law should hold such redistributions
presumptively improper.
There may be good reason to retain incumbent managers, particularly if
it appears that the firm’s failure is the result of bad luck rather than bad
planning for inevitable business cycles, or if the firm’s future success
requires specialized knowledge unlikely to be found in outside managers.
But these will be exceptions. The rule should be that management is
replaced, just as the rule is that shareholders will be replaced. They have
failed in their decision making and oversight functions, respectively, and
someone else should be given a chance.
Second, bankruptcy reorganization ought to prioritize the interests of
undiversified participants such as employees. One major function of
diversified financial investors is insurance: to accept and diversify away
firm-specific risk. In standard accounts of corporate finance, this risk is the
primary service for which investors are paid. We ought to take that
commitment seriously. If investors have been paid to accept risk, they ought
to accept it rather than deflect it on to employees and other less diversified
firm participants.
Third, in insolvency, parties that have no voice in ordinary corporate
law should be given votes. Employees, pensioners, and (to the extent that
the firm lacks direct market competitors) suppliers and customers have a
special relationship with the particular institution—parallel to the special
connection that citizens have with their own country—that is different from
the more transactional relationship that diversified financial investors have.
Since the existence and future of the firm is more important to them, and
they are more likely to lose irreparable relationships if it closes down, they
should have more influence in reorganization. This can mean a voice in
determining new management, voting rights for the board of directors or on
a plan of reorganization, even grants of equity to compensate for lost
security of tenure.
Relatedly, reorganized firms, even more than ones that have never
failed, need to escape the information and decision failures caused by
leaders with no critics. Leaders need to hear diverse and critical voices, not
just affirmations of their god-like power. Firms, therefore, need to have
alternative pathways for employees and customers to express dissatisfaction
with the powers that be—at a minimum, an ombudsmen’s office able to
accept complaints and act upon them separate from and without fear of
pressure from the ordinary hierarchy.
Critical thinking, however, is impossible in the face of overweening
power. An employee subject to firing at any time, like a customer
dependent on the company’s service, is in no position to voice objections or
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even to question obvious mistakes. Messengers are blamed often enough
that ordinary people will decide, instead, to put up with what they can and
quit on their own terms when they cannot. The institution, however, needs
voice, not exit. When dissidents disappear, the incumbents are even less
likely to see the errors in their way. Consequently, reorganization ought to
include the basics of due process—some right for subordinates to demand
something resembling a fair hearing prior to discipline, and some obligation
for superiors to accept critique and disagreement.
Finally, often a firm that enters insolvency is already too far gone for
salvation. At the beginning of the internet age, Sears had capacities that
Amazon could only dream of; Sears had been in the business of fulfillment
by mail for a century. By the time Sears filed for bankruptcy, however,
those capacities were gone. So, too, was its highly valuable reputation for
quality household tools and appliances, milked by years of managers more
interested in short-term returns than in long-term investment. It may well be
too late to return to what could have been had the company taken a different
path a decade or two ago.
When liquidation is the only alternative, insolvency law ought to
protect employees far more than is customary today. Giving employees a
protected, high priority, claim reflecting at least part of the value they lose
in liquidation would change the dynamics of intra-firm negotiations for the
better. Before insolvency, it would change the incentives of managers and
their financial masters, especially in firms dominated by unified financial
industry shareholders, such as private equity firms or hedge funds.
Under ordinary corporate law, shareholders owe no fiduciary duty to
the firm. Some shareholders, then, will find ways to profit at the expense of
the firm, by various variations on eating its seed corn. 118 Shareholders, for
example, may demand that a firm reduce investment in developing
improved versions of the product, keeping stores and infrastructure up to
date, maintaining or improving quality controls, recruiting, training and
retaining employees, or maintaining morale. Reducing such expenditures
leaves more money, in the short run, available for distribution to
shareholders. The better run a firm is, the more valuable its accumulated
expertise and reputation, the more lucrative this destruction will be to
shareholders. But it destroys the company. For the rest of us, the loss is far
greater than the shareholder’s gain.
To the extent that employees have a legally enforceable claim on the
future of the company—such as a claim for lost pay in the event of
liquidation or termination—they will be able to resist such tactics even
before insolvency, and financial players will have less incentive to strip and

118. See generally Greenwood, Puzzle of Private Equity, supra note 73 (discussing shareholder
profit at company’s expense).
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abandon our most successful firms. That is the direction we need to press
insolvency law, and, indeed, even ordinary corporate law.
CONCLUSION
Our corporate law is in a low-visibility crisis, failing its central
missions of providing good jobs for ordinary people producing useful goods
and services in a sustainable fashion. Caught between rising inequality and
rising seas, our existing institutions are too often failing to meet the
challenge of “promot[ing] the general Welfare.” 119
Insolvency indicates that a corporation has failed even on the narrowest
of measures. Rather than reinforcing the unsuccessful incumbent elite and
the structures that led to the firm’s inability to meet its responsibilities, the
law should take the crisis as an opportunity to reform and rebuild, replacing
the feudal remnants of corporate law’s property-based authoritarianism with
more democratic and republican models of governance.
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